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Individuals compete against each other in a variety of different settings. In
labor markets they compete for promotion; in athletic tournaments they compete
for fixed prizes. Important aspects of competitive choices include the probability of
success, expected payoff's, the level of ambiguity regarding success, and preferences to
compete. I explore the effects of biology and relative performance feedback in regard
to these components in three essays.
In the first essay I use a unique experiment design to measure ambiguity
aversion, which can be modified to also control for risk aversion. A measure of
ambiguity aversion has value as individuals in labor markets have ambiguous signals
about their probabilities of success in competition. Consequently this measure may
be used in future experiment designs to control for heterogeneous preferences for
ambiguity and to test whether ambiguity aff'ects behaviors differently than risk.
IV
Economic experiments have shown that when given the choice between piece
rate and winner-take-all tournament style compensation, women are more reluctant
than men to choose tournaments. In the second essay I replicate these findings
and then show that giving relative performance feedback moves high ability women
towards more competitive compensation schemes, moves low ability men towards
less competitive compensation schemes, and removes the gender difference in
compensation choices. I then examine differences in choices for women, across
the menstrual cycle. I find that women in the low-hormone phase of their cycle
are less likely to enter tournaments than women in the high-hormone phase. Men
are more likely to choose tournaments than women at either stage. There are no
significant selection differences between any of these groups after they receive relative
performance feedback.
Athletic labor markets provide a unique environment where individuals choose
to compete when they have high quality information about their potential com-
petitors. Gender differences for competition have been found to be removed when
information about relative abilities is available. In the third essay, to explore the effect
of information in a labor market setting, I use a unique data set of approximately
6,000 female and male competitive tennis players during the 2009 season. I focus
on whether males and females choose to enter competitive tournaments differently in
response to past performance. I find that males continue to compete after performing
well in the previous week while females are less likely to compete if they do well.
These contrasting behaviors suggest that males and females respond differently to
performance feedback.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the proceeding chapters I explore the effects of information for individual
decision making. I first consider how a lack of information for uncertain outcomes may
affect individuals for simulated investment decisions. I find a possible experimental
design that may help explore ambiguity effects in the future.
In Chapter III, I examine how information about individuals' abilities compared
to potential competitors changes how they enter competitive environments. Specif-
ically, I find that such information may remove gender differences for competition.
Thus, such relative performance feedback may help eliminate some of the gender
differences we find today in labor markets.
In Chapter III I also consider a biological reason for gender differences for
competition. Females experience large and fairly predictable hormonal fluctuations
across the menstrual cycle or from hormonal birth control use. I show that entry
into competitive environments is correlated with these hormonal fluctuations. Thus,
predictable biological functions may playa role in explaining some of the heterogeneity
or inconsistencies that is observed by individuals in economic markets.
In the following chapter, I examine a market where both men and women
compete: the market of professional tennis players. This market consists of
very competitive individuals where both men and women compete under similar
institutions. Furthermore, these market institutions provide very good relative
performance feedback. In an economic laboratory it was found that males and females
2compete similarly in environments with good relative performance information;
therefore, I examine whether men and women choose to enter tournaments in a
similar fashion in an actual labor market. I find that even in these settings men
and women behave differently. Specifically, the effects of past performance seem to
have very different effects for men and women. Consequently, further understanding
of the economic consequences of heterogeneous effects to feedback must be understood
before using performance feedback as a policy mechanism for both genders to compete
efficiently.
3CHAPTER II
WTP TO REMOVE AMBIGUITY EFFECTS
2.1 Introduction
In discussions of ambiguity, uncertainty and risk, the terms often get inter-
changed. For the purposes of this exposition, I will attempt to maintain a certain
degree of consistency in how the terms are used. Risk involves using knowable and
well defined probabilities to describe a random event. Uncertainty and risk will be
used to describe an asset that has an underlying probability distribution containing
calculable risks. Thus, uncertainty will refer to a situation where outcomes become
unknown due to first or second order probability distributions. Such outcomes can
be modeled as lotteries or compound lotteries.
To describe ambiguity, I will use the definition found in Kagel and Roth (1995):
ambiguity involves known-to-be-missing information. For example, ambiguity may
refer to the case where the individual does not have a clear signal as to the second order
probability distribution that is compounding an underlying risky asset. Ambiguity
can occur if an individual is not sure about what distribution (normal, log-normal,
uniform) is being used for a set of known lotteries; such an individual has trouble
forming beliefs about the possible distributions regarding an underlying asset from
ambiguous signals or past experience.
For example, individuals often encounter some degree of ambiguity about
investment assets or potential workers. This ambiguity can occur in the form of
4a reference letter that ambiguously states that a worker's performance was often
discussed by supervisors without stating if the quality of performance was high or
low. This ambiguous signal leaves a potential employer wrestling with ambiguity
regarding the quality of the potential hire. Another form of ambiguity that may
occur is in bluffing situations, such as the game of poker: poker players will bet on
an asset (their hand) so as to create an ambiguous signal about the distribution of
dealt cards. Once the hands are dealt, it is difficult to read which cards are being
played by opponents, even more so once ambiguous signals are sent through betting
behavior. A Texas Hold 'em poker player understands that a deck of cards has a
known distribution across 52 cards, but the particular distribution of cards dealt to
opponents takes on a different strategic meaning. Players form assumptions about
the dealt distribution based on private information (one's own hand of cards) and
public signalling in the form of betting. Ambiguous signals may leave the card player
with no better assumption than to play the naive distribution of the other 50 cards
that was known to exist prior to the hands being dealt. 1
To measure ambiguity aversion, I use a unique experimental framework to re-
examine a classic urn problem that has been widely used to characterize ambiguity
and uncertainty, the so-called Ellsberg urn (F.R. Knight 1921, D. Ellsberg 1961,
L.J. Savage 1972). Previous experiments have examined notions of ambiguity and
uncertainty by observing subjects' revealed preferences concerning bets from two
possible urns or in recording subjects' values of lotteries between an uncertain urn
1In Texas Hold 'em each player receives two cards each.
5and an ambiguous urn (C.R. Fox & A. Tversky 1995, C. Heath & A. Tversky 1991).
Often these urns consist of something similar to the following:
1. An urn with a known mixture of 10 red and black balls (Le. 5 red and 5 black).
(Uncertain Urn)
2. An urn with an unknown mixture of 10 balls for which any could be red or
black. (Ambiguous Urn)
Subjects must bet on pulling out a ball of a certain color from one of these urns and
they have the option of picking whether that ball will be pulled out of the Uncertain
or Ambiguous urn.
Results show that most individuals prefer to bet on the Risky urn instead of
the Ambiguous urn. In a recent study, Halvey (2007) uses the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak (1964) mechanism to examine which theory best describes the valuations
of these urns by individuals. Halevy (2007) focuses on the relationships between
individual attitudes towards ambiguity and compound objective lotteries. Previously,
Lichtenstein et al. (1978) found that individuals typically have biases that lead
them to overestimate the frequencies of low probability events and underestimate
high probability events. These types of biases were also found to exist in exploring
the accuracy of mortality risk among a general population (JK Hakes & WK
Viscusi 2004). These types of biases may impact how individuals evaluate ambiguous
situations because if the risks are well defined, and agents are informed of them, then
such biases will be removed.
6This experiment focuses on individuals' willingness to pay (WTP) to remove
ambiguity. As opposed to providing subjects with different urns and lotteries, I take
a different approach to examine the effects of ambiguity. I use an experiment where
subjects must invest in an ambiguous asset, but the novelty of this experimental design
is that subjects can spend part of their possible investment to remove some or all of the
effects of ambiguity associated with the asset. To my knowledge, there have been only
two experiments that use sampling of an urn by individuals to remove the effects of
ambiguity (J.S. Chipman 1960, G. Gigliotti & B. Sopher 1996).2 In these experiments,
the sampling was costless and the effect of sampling was the topic of study. My WTP
task, in combination with the Holt and Laury (2002) risk aversion task, allows me to
examine whether risk aversion is correlated with aversion to ambiguity. Furthermore,
the design provides the tools necessary to calculate lower bounds on the ex-ante beliefs
that individuals form as a consequence of sampling the urn.
In contrast to a recent study by Moore and Eckel (2003), who measure ambiguity
aversion as an aversion to second-order probability distributions, I attempt to create
a more ambiguous situation. One that leaves subjects with missing information
about the second-order probability distribution used to generate a risky asset. Eckel
and Moore use a range of probabilities and dollar amounts for a risky asset and
allow subjects to choose between the fuzzy probability or fuzzy dollar amount and
a "sure thing" dollar amount. This approach provides a measure of attitudes
towards compound probabilities and fuzzy dollar amounts and not necessarily towards
ambiguity.
2Chipman only used 10 subjects
7I focus on how individuals pay to remove some or all or none of the effects
of ambiguity involved with the asset. In a computerized experiment individuals are
given an urn with 10 balls that could be black and red, where the mixture of black
and red balls is unknown. Individuals are not informed as to the random generating
process used to create the mix of black and red balls in the urn, thus creating an
ambiguous situation regarding the distribution that compounds a gamble. A priori,
if one has symmetric beliefs, then a 0.5 probability should be assigned to drawing a
black or red ball. Individuals are given a budget (w) for the investment task from
which they can pay for a costly sample (c per ball) from the urn. An individual
can sample the urn before betting on whether they will remove a red or black ball.
For example, if an individual samples 3 balls then 3 balls are removed from the urn
simultaneously and shown to the subject for a cost of 3c. The balls are then placed
back in the urn and the subject must bet on a color with the full remaining amount
of his investment budget (from the example the amount remaining is w - 3c). If an
individual correctly guesses the color of the ball that gets drawn, after being given
the opportunity to pay to sample the urn, then he receives twice the amount of the
budget that is left after he pays to sample the urn's contents.
During experiment sessions, individuals also participate in a task used to
determine their risk preferences. The Holt and Laury (2002) method is used to
estimate coefficients of relative risk aversion (CRRA). I find that a large number of
individuals are willing to pay to remove some of the effects of ambiguity. Only 19%
of subjects were willing to gamble on the urn without paying for a costly sample
beforehand. I find that the estimated risk aversion coefficients playa significant role
8in how individuals' are willing to pay to remove the effects of ambiguity. Assuming
that prior beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals,3 it seems that risk averse
individuals over-weight the tails of probability distributions of outcomes; in other
words, they seem to believe very unlikely outcomes are likely to occur.
The following section will provide a description of subjects, this will be followed
by a detailed explanation of the risk aversion experiment. The third section will focus
on the experiment concerning the WTP to remove ambiguity. The fourth section will
provide a discussion of results and will review the apparent beliefs of individuals.
2.2 Subjects
Experiment participants consisted of seventy undergraduate students (11
females and 59 males) who were enrolled in an intermediate-level economics class
at a mid-size public university.4 Subjects' ages were between 19 and 34 with a mean
of 22 and a standard deviation of 2.3 years. There were three experiment sessions
that lasted approximately thirty minutes each, and the numbers of students in each
session were: 26, 27, and 17 respectively.5
Subjects were paid $2.35 (SD: 1.36) on average for their task performance with
a minimum payout of $0.10 and a maximum of $4 per session. The total amount paid
out for these experiment sessions was $164.70. Sessions consisted of 3 different types
of experiments and subjects were made aware that their payoffs would depend on
3These prior beliefs come from a subjective expected utility model (Savage 1972)
473 students participated, but three were unable to complete the entire session or had erroneous
self-recording of some of their key data.
5Sessions took place during class time though participation was completely voluntary.
9their performance in those experiments as well as some random luck. Subjects were
informed that their payoffs would be based on just one of the experiments, which was
randomly chosen.
2.3 Risk Aversion Experiment
The first experiment in which subjects participated involved a simple task
designed to extract a measure of risk aversion for each participant. This method
was used by Holt and Laury (2002) to estimate coefficients of relative risk aversion
(CRRA). I use the same procedure to estimate a CRRA for each individual in this
study. But due to the findings of Holt and Laury concerning different risk averse
behaviors for different monetary amounts, I estimate these coefficients using monetary
amounts that were similar for each experiment during the session.6
Individuals were given a table with a list of ten decisions to make. The decisions
involve a choice between a safe investment with payoffs of $2 in the good state and
$1.50 in the bad state, which is called Option A. The other option (Option B) is
a risky investment with payoffs of $4 in the good state and $0.10 in the bad state.
The ten decisions vary in terms of the probabilities of a good state and bad state
occurring. For the first decision the probability of the good state is equal to 0.1 and
the probability of a bad state is 0.9. For each subsequent decision the probability of
the good state increases by 0.1 and the probability of a bad state decreases by 0.1.
6In their study, Holt and Laury showed that the a simple CRRA utility function was inadequate.
Individuals behaved differently with higher payoffs; this difference was exhibited by an increase in the
CRRA with higher payoffs. This result suggested that the CRRA was not constant across payoffs.
Instead, they used a hybrid "power-expo" function (A. Saha 1993) to model risk preferences, based
on the methods used in this experiment I am unable to do the same.
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Thus, rational individuals are expected to choose option A for the first few decisions
before switching to option B as the probability of the bad state decreases. 7
Similar to Holt and Laury (2002), I estimate a risk aversion paremeter using a
CRRA utility function for money (x) as follows:
x 1- r
u(x) = -1-
-r
(2.3.1)
Assuming the utility function for individuals really takes this functional form, a risk
loving individual has r < 0, a risk neutral person has r = 0, and a risk averse
person has r > O. The payoffs for the lottery in the experiment are such that a risk
neutral person should choose four safe options (Option A) before switching over to
the risky option (Option B) for the fifth decision. Participants were taken through a
demonstration of the experiment and were shown how the possible payoffs would be
chosen prior to filling in their own risk aversion experiment sheet.
Figure 1 provides the estimates for the maximum CRRA for switching to Option
B for a given decision. If the CRRA of an individual is higher for a given decision
than the coefficient shown in the far right column of Figure 1 then the individual
is more risk averse than the coefficient and will refrain from switching until a later
decision.
Table 1 shows the frequency of switching for all experiment participants. In
general, subjects seem to be risk averse because approximately 76% of subjects switch
7There was a positive probability that subjects were paid for these choices so these were real
choices and not just stated choices.
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FIGURE 1. Risk Aversion Experiment: Expected Value Differences and CRRA
Estimates From Switching
Decision OptwuA Option B Expected Payoff Diff GRRAMax. to
(EVA-EVB) 8Wlteh to B
! $200 iftbe die is I $400 if the die IS 1 L06 -1446
$\50 i£the tlie is 2-10 $al0 i£the ,heis 2-10
, $2.00 If the die is 1-2 $4.00 if the dlea 1-2 072 -0761
-
$150 If the dleis 3-10 $0.10 If the die IS 3-!0
3 noD If the diels 1-3 $400 if the die is 1-3 038 -0.346
$lS0lfthedleis4·10 $O.!O iEthe die 1s4-1O
4 $2 00 i£lhe die IS 1-4 $400 if the die IS 1-4 0.04 -0033
$1 50 if the die is 5-1 0 $010 I£lhe die IS 5-10
5 $200 if the (lie is 1-5 $400 If the die is 1-5 -0.30 0 0 "~ .:)J
$150 if the diets 6-10 $010 if the dlels 6-10
6 $200 i€the die is 1-6 $4.00 If the die is 1-6 -0.64 048
$150 if the die is 7-10 $0 10 If the die IS 7-10
7 $200ifthedlels 1-7 $4.00 if the die IS 1-7 -0.98 073
SUO If the die is 8-10 SOl0ifthedlels8-JO
8 nOD If the dieis 1-8 $400 if the die is 1-8 -132 1 012
$150 if the die IS 9-10 $0.10 if the die IS 9- i 0
9 $200 iEthe die is 1-9 $400 if the die IS 1-9 -166 1 397
S)50 i£lhe die is 10 $O.IOifthe die IS 10
!O $2 00 i£lhe che is 1-10 $4.00 if the diel. 1-10 ., 18.179
to Option B between decisions 5 and 7. This switching behavior suggests that these
subjects have relative risk aversion coefficients between 0.0 and 0.7. Approximately
19% of the sample exhibit risk loving behavior and only two subjects wait until
decision 10 to switch, suggesting a very extreme form of relative risk aversion.
For the most part subjects seemed to behave rationally. Only 4 subjects reversed
their behavior after switching to Option E.8 These individuals chose Option B for an
early decision and then for a later decision they reversed their behavior and switched
back to Option A. This behavior cannot be considered very rational, though the
possibility exists that in brief time period these individuals' relative risk aversion
parameters were fiuctuating. 9 At times, the individuals who reversed behavior are
BIn Holt and Laury (2002) reversals were as high 13% (28 of 212) for some treatments.
9Though this behavior is possible it is not very plausible. Instead, I believe subjects did not
understand the experiment or were not motivated enough by the economic consequences.
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TABLE 1. Frequency of Risk Aversion Coefficients
Switch B
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
CRRA
-0.761
-0.346
-0.033
0.233
0.480
0.730
1.012
18.179
Freq.
2
7
4
21
19
13
2
2
%
2.86
10.00
5.71
30.00
27.14
18.57
2.86
2.86
Cum.
2.86
12.86
18.57
48.57
75.71
94.29
97.14
100.00
Total 70 100.00
excluded from estimations when these reversals are included in any model then an
indicator variable helps identify them as being different from the rest of the sample.
TABLE 2. Summary Statistics for Risk Aversion
Stats Switch B CRRA Reversal
Mean 5.53 0.83 0.06
SD 1.57 3.02 0.23
Max 10 18.18 1
Min 2 -0.76 0
Entire sample of 70 subjects.
The summary statistics for the risk aversion experiment are shown in Table 2.
Most individuals switch in the vicinity of decisions 5 and 6 and on average this group
of subjects has an approximate relative risk aversion parameter of 0.83. The average
relative risk aversion parameter is skewed by two individuals who appear to have a
risk aversion parameter such that r E (1.40,18.18), which is a very extreme form
of risk aversion. After removing these individuals from the sample, I find that the
average CRRA is 0.315 (SD 0.38). This implies that the mean CRRA is within the
13
range of [0.23,0.48]. The removal of the two extremely risk averse candidates leads
to an average CRRA that is more in line with the average switching behavior. This
correction is important as using the entire sample for estimation purposes to measure
CRRA effects can lead to very implausible results.
TABLE 3. Summary Statistics for Individual Characteristics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Female 0.16 0.37 70
Age 22.15 2.29 69
Econometrics 0.15 0.362 72
Session 1.87 0.78 70
Differences in observations are due to skipped questions by subjects.
Table 3 provides the summary statistics for individual characteristics that may
be relevant to risk aversion, which include gender, age, whether they are currently
enrolled in an econometrics class, and session that individual self selected to attend. lO
Subjects could attend one of three possible sessions that were held in consecutive
order; subjects were free to self-select into sessions until they became fullY
The possibility exists that individuals who finished earlier sessions would pass by
individuals attending the subsequent session. There may have been communication
between individuals from different sessions, which could have affected people in later
lOOne individual chose not to report his or her age. There are two individuals who are included
in the summary statistics, but these two individuals inaccurately entered their data; thus, they have
been excluded from the estimating sample.
11 Only the first session came close to being full. To help spread subjects between sessions, three or
four subjects were rescheduled to the third session. Due to hardware difficulties in the first session,
the second and third sessions started about 15 minutes late.
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sessions. These communication effects, as well as self-selection into different sessions,
could contribute to systematic differences between session participants.
TABLE 4. Estimation of Decision to Switch to Option B (Risk Aversion)
Coefficient
Female
Age
Econometrics
Session
Constant
Observations
R2
R2 Adj
F
LL
dLr
N
Pseudo R2
Chi 2
OLS
Decision Num.
-0.540
(0.464)
0.024
(0.081 )
0.927*
(0.471)
0.485**
(0.224)
4.235**
(1.865)
65
0.137
0.0795
2.382
-110.7
60
65
Tobit
Decision Num.
-0.516
(0.460)
0.022
(0.080)
0.953**
(0.467)
0.492**
(0.222)
4.268**
(1.846)
65
-112.5
61
65
0.0393
9.208
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.OI, ** p<0.05, * p<O.1
Excludes reversals and one individual who did not report age.
Table 4 provides coefficient estimates across individual characteristics predicting
which decision an individual is likely to switch from the safe asset to the risky asset. A
significant positive coefficient for a variable implies greater risk aversion. In the second
15
column, I use a doubly truncated Tobit estimation since the dependent variable, can
be no greater than 10 and no less than 1 (though no individual switched at decision
1) .
I find that individuals who were enrolled in an econometrics class during the
term of the experiment (Fall) tend to switch to option B approximately one decision
later than comparable individuals who are not enrolled in econometrics. Note that
this is not necessarily an effect of taking an econometrics class (though such an effect
cannot be ruled out). This coefficient may suggest that individuals participating in
econometrics classes during the fall term are more risk averse than those that take the
class in a different (later) term or not at all. I find that individuals who participate
in a later sessions appear to be more risk averse on average than individuals who
participate in earlier sessions. Furthermore, I find that neither age nor gender playa
significant role in risk aversion, although the age variance in this sample is very small.
Though some of the effects of individuals' characteristics on risk aversion are
significant at the 5% level, these characteristics explain very little of the variation
in the risk aversion parameter. The purpose of this risk aversion experiment was
not specifically to establish the determinants of risk aversion; instead, the goal was
to infer approximate individual coefficients of relative risk aversion to test whether
risk aversion can help explain an individual's WTP to remove ambiguity. In the
next section, I outline the experiment concerning WTP to remove ambiguity and
test whether estimated relative risk aversion coefficients playa role in an individual's
WTP. The findings from this section will be used to make inferences about how
individuals appear to deal with ambiguity.
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2.4 WTP to Reduce Ambiguity
Previous studies examining ambiguity and uncertainty using the composition of
balls in an urn have focused on valuation differences between urns (Fox & Tversky
1995), or revealed preference choice, or paying to bet on drawing a ball from an
urn with a known composition of balls versus an urn with an unknown composition
(S.W. Becker & F.O. Brownson 1964). This last type of urn problem has become
known as the Ellsberg urn- though Savage and Knight were instrumental in the
use of this type of urn choice to explain vagueness of probabilities or ambiguity.
A vast number of papers has been published using this framework, exploring topics
such as subjective probability, subadditivity of subjective probabilities (D. Schmeidler
1989), comparative ignorance (Fox & Tversky 1995), and max-min approaches to
rationalize decisions under uncertainty (Y. Halevy 2007). Since standard economic
theory cannot explain many of the behaviors exhibited in these urn experiments,
many different theories have attempted to rationalize actions observed in experimental
settings. None of these studies have focused on how much individuals may be willing
to pay to reduce the effects of ambiguity from the ambiguous urn.
Instead of the standard revealed preference experiment design, between an urn
of unknown risks and known risks, I use a unique framework wherein an individual
is forced into investing in an asset with ambiguous risks. Individuals are provided
with the opportunity to pay to remove the ambiguity from an urn with an unknown
composition of balls as opposed to being provided with the option to invest using
an urn with a known composition of balls (or risks). This unique design allows
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one to measure the amount of ambiguity individuals are willing to pay to remove.
Previous studies using the revealed preference method conclude that risk aversion
is not necessarily a determinant of an individual's preference to bet on an urn with
a known composition as opposed an unknown composition. Using the risk aversion
measures discussed above, one is able to test the role that risk aversion may play in
an individual's WTP to reduce the effects of ambiguity.
2.4.1 Experiment Design
Individuals were endowed with a budget w. They were then were given an
asset, in the form of an urn filled with 10 balls. For this urn, they had to make an
investment of their entire budget on pulling a Black or a Red ball out of the urn.
If the ball that came out of the urn was the same color as the one they predicted,
then they would double their investment; if the ball was a different color, then they
would lose the entire amount invested. Subjects did not know the actual compostion
of Black or Red balls in the urn, but they had to bet on either a Red or a Black ball
being pulled from the urn.
However, each subject had the opportunity to sample the urn, at a cost of (c)
per ball, to learn more about the composition of Black and Red balls in the urn. In
this experiment, a subject had a budget, w = $2, and to sample from the urn cost
$0.10 per ball (c =$0.10). If a subject wanted to sample 3 balls it cost $0.30. After
choosing the number of balls that would be sampled, the colors of the (3) balls from
the urn would be shown simultaneously to the subject before being placed back into
the urn. A subject then had to bet the full amount left in his budget ($1. 70) on
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either Black or Red. After placing this bet on Black or Red, the computer drew one
of the 10 balls from the urn at random. If the subject chose the color of the drawn
ball correctly, his payoff was twice what he bet. In the example above, this amount is
$3.40. If the subject chose a different color ball than the one drawn, then he received
a payoff of $0.00 (i.e. he lost the full amount of his wager).
This experiment forced subjects to consider ambiguity in their decision making.
Subjects were uncertain about the composition of balls in the urn and ambiguity
arises from the subject's lack of information about the second order probability
distribution dictating the mixtures of balls in the urns. Subjects were not informed of
the random generating process used to create the composition of balls in the virtual
urns, which was a symmetric binomial distribution. Thus, there was ambiguity as to
which random generating process was used to fill the urns. If a subject chose to learn
the entire composition of balls in the urn, then the bet still contained risk (unless
all the balls in the urn were of one color). Even if all the balls were sampled, then
subjects still had little idea as to what the distribution of possible mixtures might be.
But the effect of "not knowing" the second order probability distribution (i.e. the
effect of ambiguity) is removed by such sampling.
This experiment design allows us to observe the extent to which individuals
are willing to pay to remove ambiguity. This experiment design is quite similar to
individual investment decisions in financial markets. An individual may be willing to
pay to get information about an asset (stock or mutual fund), which may inform him
or her of some of the risks associated with investing in the asset, but there is still a
great deal of unknowable uncertainty that remains about investing in such an asset.
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2.4.2 Maximization in the Urn Problem
The sampling of the urn, at first glance, should be a simple expected utility
problem. In the classic Ellsberg example, if an individual has the choice between
an urn filled with 5 Black and 5 Red balls, or an urn filled with 10 balls for which
any mixture of Red and Black balls could be present, then that individual should
be indifferent between betting on pulling out a certain color from either urn. Under
expected utility theory, this indifference holds for any symmetric distribution; thus, so
long as an individual does not believe that the urn was not generated in a manner that
skews the composition towards a certain color then he or she should be indifferent.
The innovation in this experiment is that there is no choice of urns; an individual
must consider whether he can benefit from sampling rather than investing in an asset
based upon symmetric odds of loss or gain. The benefit to sampling is based on an
individual's prior beliefs about the possible distributions of different compositions of
urns. This difference is explored below.
Consider an urn containing a mix of balls that is generated using a symmetric
binomial process where the probability of a ball being Red is 0.5 (i.e. Pred = 0.5)
and the probability of a ball being Black is the same (i.e. Pblack = 1 - Pred = 0.5). If
an urn has 10 balls then the number of unique possible urns is 1,024. The frequency
distribution of such an composition generating process is shown in Figure 2 and
the distribution approximates a normal distribution. 12 This type of urn-generating
12Historically, the binomial process was the first use of the normal distribution, introduced in
Abraham de Moivre's book The Doctrine of Chances in 1733. Often in textbooks this approximation
is shown as a consequence of the central limit theorem, since B(n, p) is a sum of n independent
identically distributed Bernoulli variables with parameter p.
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process implies that the extreme outcomes of 10 Red balls or 10 Black balls are very
unlikely. If, instead, the 11 possible compositions of urns are equally distributed,
following a uniform distribution, then an urn filled with 10 Red balls is equally as
likely as an urn filled with 5 Red balls. The difference between these two distributional
assumptions can lead to very different optimal behaviors when it comes to making
costly samples from the urn. The frequencies and probabilities are shown in Table 5
to highlight the probability differences between these two different distributions.
TABLE 5. Urn Compositions with Different Distributions
No. of Red Balls Uniform Urns Uniform Prob. I Binomial Urns Binomial Prob.
0 1 0.091 1 0.001
1 1 0.091 10 0.01
2 1 0.091 45 0.044
3 1 0.091 120 0.117
4 1 0.091 210 0.205
5 1 0.091 252 0.246
6 1 0.091 210 0.205
7 1 0.091 120 0.117
8 1 0.091 45 0.044
9 1 0.091 10 0.01
10 1 0.091 1 0.001
Total 11 1 1024 1
There are many other possible distributions of the number of red balls, but for
simplicity I limit this comparison to these two symmetric distributions. Initially, an
individual has no reason to believe one distribution is more probable than the other.
Thus, this experiment provides the opportunity to extract some notion of individuals'
priors about the distribution of urns that they face.
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In this experiment, the individual is assumed to maximize his or her expected
utility by choosing to sample a certain number of balls from the urn prior to betting.
This maximization problem is shown for individual i in Equation (2.4.1) where ex is
the dollar amount invested in the draw from the urn.
(2.4.1)
S.t. ex + ex = w
The variable z provides the return if the ball. In this experiment z = 2 when the
ball matches the one color that was bet on. The number of balls sampled in advance
is represented by x and e is the cost of sampling each ball. Individual i's subjective
ex-ante distribution for the return z depends on that individual's prior beliefs, Hi,
about the distribution of balls and possible urns. The function P(z = 2) represents
the probability of the individual betting on a color and being correct. The expected
utility depends on the individual's updated subjective distribution for return z after
sampling a certain number of balls, x, from the urn. The risk aversion experiment task
from above has shown that the group of individuals participating in this experiment
is heterogeneous in terms of risk preferences; thus, this heterogeneity is represented
by a different utility function form Ui (.) for each individual i.
The distributional assumptions concerning the probabilities for each of the
eleven possible urns affect how many balls an individual should optimally sample.
In this experiment the return on the urn can be one of two possibilities, z E {G, 2} as
the individual receives twice his wager if he is correct about the color of the ball pulled
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from the urn and receives zero if he is incorrect. I will assume that every individual's
utility function is such that Ui(O) = o. For simplicity, I will simplify this analysis of
the maximization problem to focus only on expected values. The possibility exists
that individuals' prior beliefs, in terms of urn distributions, are correlated with the
type of utility function they have. In other words individual's risk preferences may be
correlated with beliefs. In the following section, I explore the ex-ante expected values
from sampling under two different distributions, the uniform distribution and the
binomial (normal) distribution. In the subsequent section, I test whether individuals'
estimated risk aversion parameters appear to influence how many balls are sampled
from the urn. If the risk aversion parameters are positively correlated with sampling
then this would suggest that ambiguity is processed by individuals in a similar manner
as risk and uncertainty.
2.4.3 Expected Value Assuming Different Distributions
To examine the effects of different distributional priors regarding the space of
possible urn compositions, consider a uniform distribution of urns compared to the
binomial (normal) distribution. An individual is willing to sample the urn so long as
the expected benefit from sampling is greater than the cost. In deciding how many
balls to sample, an individual compares the net benefits of sampling differently or
not sampling at all. An urn could be composed of 11 different possible combinations
of Red and Black balls; sampling a single ball allows an individual to remove one
possible urn from the 11 possible combinations. For example, if an individual observes
a sample of a Red ball from the urn, then that individual has learned that this urn is
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not entirely composed of Black balls. In sampling a single ball an individual eliminates
an urn that would be entirely composed of a single color. The benefit of sampling
depends on how probable the extreme compositions of urns being filled with one color
actually are. Consequently, fatter tails in the probability distribution of outcomes,
such as the uniform distribution, makes sampling more beneficial. This occurs because
each ball sampled removes a single possible composition; with a uniform distribution
each possible combination of balls has an equal probability of occurring.
With a uniform distribution of urns, an individual has an ex-ante optimal
number of balls they should sample. Given that not sampling the urn gives an
individual a 50% chance of drawing a Red or Black ball. This probability exists so
long as the individual's prior beliefs do not involve skewing the possible distributions
towards one color or another, that is if the individual believes that one possible
distribution is skewed towards Black balls then he also believes there is an equal
likelihood of an equivalently skewed distribution towards Red balls. Furthermore,
the possibility exists that if he or she draws an even number of balls then he or she
has gained no benefit from sampling. This lack of benefit exists because an even ball
sample can provide a symmetric number of Red balls to Black balls. Recall that in
this experiment individuals are endowed with $2 and the cost for each ball sample is
$0.10. After sampling the return to correctly predicting the color of the ball to be
drawn is 100% and the return to being wrong about the color costs 100%. Table 6
provides a comparison of the ex-ante expected values of sampling between the two
possible distributions that are being considered.
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TABLE 6. Expected Values from Sampling
Ball Sample
Uniform
Expected Value Marginal 6
Binomial
Expected Value Marginal 6
2.00 0.00
1.90 -.10
1.81 -0.09
1.73 -0.08
1.65 -0.08
1.58 -0.07
1.52 -0.06
1.48 -0.04
1.41 -0.07
1.35 -0.05
1.25 -0.10
o
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2.00 0.00
2.09 0.09
1.98 -0.11
2.04 0.06
1.92 -0.12
1.95 0.03
1.82 -0.13
1.82 0.00
1.68 -0.14
1.65 -0.03
1
1.50 -0.15
-------------
From Figure 3, one can observe the prior beliefs about the distribution of red and
black balls in the urn playa pivotal role in deciding whether it is optimal to sample
from the urn. An individual who has a prior belief that the set of possible compositions
of balls in the urns was formed using a binomial method should not sample the urn
at all. On the other hand, an individual who believes that the possible compositions
of urns are uniformly distributed is justified in sampling one or three balls as opposed
to none, since both these sampling strategies lead to higher expectedvalues. However
an individual with such a prior belief would find it optimal to just sample one balI,13
The purpose of this analysis was to show that based on two difT'erent prior
beliefs about the urns, an individual may be justified in sampling one, or three balls
as compared to the option of not sampling any. Thus, this sheds new light on the
13Underlying this entire analysis is the assumption that an individual will bet according to the
signal he or she receives. For example, if an individual samples three balls and observes Red, Red,
Black then that individual will bet on Red.
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Ellsberg urn problem because if an individual was truly indifferent between an urn
with an unknown composition and an urn with 5 Red balls and 5 Black balls then one
would expect that sampling would bring no value to that individual. In the following
section, the results from the urn experiment are analyzed. I look for systematic
behavioral differences to investigate the possible cause of a large variance in urn
sampling decisions.
2.4.4 Urn Experiment Results
The urn experiment was run in three separate sessions and a total of 68
participants provided data that was usable for this analysis. There is a surprisingly
large amount of variation in the number of balls sampled from the urn prior to betting
on Red or Black. The frequency distribution in Table 7 shows that almost 20% of
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subjects chose not to sample the urn and over 66% of subjects chose to sample between
between 2 and 5 balls.
TABLE 7, Frequency of Balls Sampled
Item Number Percent
o 13 19.1
1 1 1.5
2 7 10.3
3 12 17.6
4 15 22.1
5 11 16.2
6 5 7.4
7 2 2.9
8 1 1.5
10 1 1 1_.5
Tota}] 68 100.0
According to predictions about behavior concernmg the Ellsberg Urn, the
sampling of the urn should not be related to risk aversion because individuals will
treat the urn as a compound lottery across all possible distributions. Based on the
previous section that explored two different distributional assumptions, I hypothesize
that individuals who are more risk averse will sample the urn more because their priors
weight the tails of the distribution which in reality are the more extreme outcomes.
Compared to a less risk averse individual, a more risk averse individual forms a prior
distributional belief that the extreme outcomes of having an urn filled with all (or
many) Red balls or all (or many) Black balls are more likely to occur than other
compositions. To consider this, I use the CRRA values for individuals found from the
risk aversion experiment that was discussed previously. Figure 4 shows the boxplots
of balls sampled according to the individuals' CRRA. If one ignores the extreme
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form of risk aversion (CRRA=18.179), these boxplots suggest that there is a positive
relationship between an individual's risk aversion coefficient and the number of balls
he or she samples from the urn.
FIGURE 4. Number of Balls Sampled According to CRRA Estimates
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To explore whether the estimated CRRA can help predict the number of balls
an individual samples from the urn, I estimate both ordinary least squares (OLS) and
Tobit regression models. These estimates are shown in Table 8. In these models, I
include variables identifying individuals as being currently enrolled in an econometrics
class and whether they are female. Due to the non-randomness of session attendance,
I include a variable for session attended (1, 2, 3). I find that after including these
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control variables that the CRRA has a significant positive coefficient with respect to
the number of balls sampled.
2.5 Discussion
These results suggest that risk aversion has an effect on how an individual deals
with ambiguity. The Ellsberg urn problem is often given as an example of ambiguity
where an individual is willing to bet on an urn with a known composition as opposed
to one with an unknown composition. The results from this experiment suggest that
risk aversion may playa role in how an individual approaches such an ambiguous
situation. I caution that this does not imply that this risk aversion effect has a direct
effect on ambiguity aversion. Instead, risk averse individuals may have very different
prior beliefs about the distributions of urns compared to individuals who are less risk
averse. I believe that there may be a positive correlation between risk aversion and
the over-weighting of the tails of distributions. Thus, risk aversion may be linked to
the subjective probabilities used for evaluating ambiguous outcomes by individuals.
In a previous section, it was shown that some sampling of the balls in the urn can
be value maximizing. Sampling more than zero balls implies that individuals must
believe they are increasing expected utility based on their distributional assumptions.
The question becomes, do these individuals behave within a rational subjective utility
framework? Do they choose a sample of balls that demonstrates plausible beliefs
in terms of the beliefs about the probability of success from sampling? Based on
the experiment performed, assuming CRRA utility function and symmetric beliefs
TABLE 8. Estimation for Urn Sampling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficient OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
CRRA 1.92** 2.32** 2.28*** 2.75*** 1.75** 2.09**
(0.82) (0.99) (0.85) (1.01) (0.85) (1.02)
Econometrics -1.88** -2.41*** -1.98*** -2.51*** -1.77** -2.26**
(0.72) (0.88) (0.71) (0.87) (0.74) (0.90)
Session -0.81** -1.01** -0.81** -1.01**
(0.34) (0041 ) (0.34) (0041 )
Female 1.10 1.29 1.09 1.27
(0.73) (0.87) (0.76) (0.91)
Constant 4.63*** 4.72*** 4.34*** 4.39*** 3.00*** 2.73***
(0.69) (0.82) (0.71) (0.83) (0.45) (0.54)
Sigma
Constant 2.38*** 2.33*** 2.45***
(0.25) (0.25) (0.26)
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62
R2 0.184 0.215 0.136
R2 Adj 0.141 0.160 0.0909
F 4.350 3.903 3.033
LL -130.1 -127.5 -128.9 -126.4 -131.9 -129.5
dLr 58 59 57 58 58 59
N 62 62 62 62 62 62
Pseudo R2 0.0485 0.0566 0.0339
Chi2 13.00 15.17 9.091
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
Source: Excluded reversals in risk aversion experiment and subjects with extreme CRRA
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concerning outcomes, I am able to calculate a lower bound on individual's subjective
beliefs. First, consider an urn with one ball that may be black or red.
2.5.0.1 1 Ball Example
The one ball case is an example of certainty equivalence using subjective prior
beliefs, Jr. There is an urn with one ball, the ball is black or red, and the individual
may sample the ball beforehand at a cost of c. An individual bets his net-budget, X,
on pulling out a red or black ball. If the individual pulls out a ball of his predicted
color, he doubles his bet. If he does not, he loses everything. The net-budget meets
the constraint X = W - c. Where c is the cost of sampling the ball beforehand and W
is the individual's initial wealth. In this one ball case the individual has a prior belief,
Jr, on pulling out his preferred (if skewed beliefs) ball. If initially he has indifferent
symmetric prior beliefs about outcomes, then Jr = 0.5.
The individual is faced with an ex-ante decision based on his priors. If this
individual chooses to sample the urn, then the following inequality must hold for an
expected utility maximizer:
U(2(W - c)) 2: JrU(2W)
Assume a utility function as follows:
x 1- r
U(x) =-
1- r
(2.5.1)
(2.5.2)
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Then the inequality simplifies to:
(2.5.3)
Assuming that the above equality is strict and constant beliefs such that 7r E (0,1),
then the willingness to pay to see a ball is greater for a more risk averse individual.
Be 1 1
- = - W7r 1 - r In7r > 0Br (1 - r)2 -
2.5.1 Derivation of Belief Bounds
(2.5.4)
Consider a sampling of balls that allows an individual to adjust his beliefs about
successfully predicting which color of ball he will pull out of the urn. Beliefs, 7r, are
a function of the number of balls an individual can sample, n. Assume that an
individual gains a non-negative ex-ante benefit from sampling a ball.
7r(n) such that 7r(n + 1) > 7r(n) (2.5.5)
In the experiment an individual chooses n such that n E {O,10}. The individual's
utility maximization problem for choosing the optimum number of balls to sample is
as follows:
max 7r(n)U(2(W - en))
nE{O,lO}
(2.5.6)
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Assume the same CRRA utility function as before. The optimal number of balls an
individual should sample, n*, satisfies the following inequality:
7f(n*)U(2(W - Cn*)) 2 7f(0)U(2W)
7f(n*)(2(W - Cn*))l-r 2 7f(0)(2W)1-r
Cn*
=} In 7f (n*) 2 In 7f (0) - (l - r) In(1 - W)
(2.5.7)
(2.5.8)
(2.5.9)
Based on the data gathered from the experiment and assuming that 7f(0) = 0.5 then
the RHS of the last inequality can be used to extract a lower bound on beliefs of
sampling. We can observe what is the lowest probability that an individual expected
to gain from sampling the number of balls that he or she chose to sample. These belief
bounds are based on the number of balls sampled and an individual's CRRA. For
individuals with a CRRA that is greater than one, the belief bound decreases with a
greater number of balls sampled. This decrease does not mean that individuals believe
that the probability is not improved from sampling; instead this decrease implies the
bound is decreasing. Thus, little information can be extrapolated regarding these
individual's beliefs whose estimated CRRA is greater than 1.
Table 9 shows the number of individuals for each respective lower bound on
beliefs found from sampling the urn. Individual choices made in regards to sampling
the urn are shown in the row groupings and the estimated CRRAs of individuals
are separated into columns. The most striking result this table provides is that no
individuals behave in a manner that suggests irrational subjective beliefs. Over 65%
of extracted lower bounds of beliefs are from 0.522 to 0.623. Thus, individuals believe
TABLE 9. Ex-ante Belief Bounds & Samples Taken by CRRA
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CRRA
SamplesTaken -.760 -.346 -.033 .233 .480 .730 1.012 18.179 Total
0 1 0 1 3 4 2 0 1 12
Belief 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2 0 0 1 0 3 1 0 1 6
Belief 0.602 0.576 0.557 0.542 0.528 0.514 0.499 0.08
3 0 1 1 3 5 2 0 0 12
Belief 0.666 0.622 0.591 0.566 0.544 0.522 0.499 0.031
4 0 2 0 7 1 3 1 0 14
Belief 0.741 0.675 0.630 0.593 0.562 0.531 0.499 0.011
5 0 1 0 6 3 1 0 0 11
Belief 0.830 0.736 0.673 0.623 0.581 0.540 0.498 0.004
6 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 5
Belief 0.937 0.808 0.723 0.657 0.602 0.551 0.498 0.001
7 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
Belief 1.068 0.893 0.780 0.696 0.626 0.562 0.497 0.000
8 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Belief 1.229 0.994 0.848 0.740 0.652 0.574 0.497 0.000
10 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Belief 1.694 1.271 1.023 0.850 0.717 0.603 0.496 0.000
Total 1 4 3 21 19 12 2 2 64
Individuals that had reversals in the risk aversion task have been removed.
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that sampling from the urn can improve their probability of success by revealing
something about the distribution of balls in the urn.
In many ways, this sampling of the urn is similar to purchasing information
about an ambiguous or uncertain asset. Similar to investment markets, individuals
seem to value information too much. In the case of the urn, the individuals in the
experiment believe that sampling the urn can lead to a much greater improvement of
subjective odds concerning success than it actually does. In fact, in extreme cases,
such as a uniform distribution across urns, some sampling can be beneficial, but the
greatest gain from sampling is at 1 ball. Not a single particpant chooses to sample
only 1 ball. Thus, individuals must have very different distributions in mind prior to
sampling. Or they need to have enough uncertainty removed from the choice problem
(Red or Black) before making a decision.
In the urn experiment, subjects behaved such that sampling the urn was
positively correlated with risk aversion. I have argued that sampling the urn is an
attempt to reduce the effects of ambiguity associated with this urn problem. Prior
to sampling, the urn with an unknown composition of balls, can be considered an
ambiguous asset. There are a number of different possible distributions that an
individual may have in mind when speculating about the composition of balls in
the urn, but these distributions are not known to the individual ex-ante. Thus,
to remove the effects of all the possible distributions, and to gain some certainty
as to what the composition of balls in the urn may be, an individual chooses how
much of this ambiguity to remove. Through this experimental design we are able
to observe (under expected utility maximizing assumptions) the bounds on beliefs
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regarding improvements on outcomes from sampling that individuals must have to
make certain sampling choices. This could be useful in helping predict optimism or
pessimism towards other perceived outcomes that may affect individuals.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this study has been to test whether individuals are willing to
pay to remove the effects of ambiguity. It can be shown, in theory, that individuals
can find it value maximizing to sample the urn and remove some ambiguity depending
on their prior beliefs about the distribution of possible risks and outcomes and the
cost of sampling. I find that many individuals sample the urn to an extent which
suggests that their prior beliefs likely do not follow a uniform or normal distribution.
The results do not imply that individuals behave irrationally, however, based on the
lower bounds derived for individuals' prior beliefs, they still behave rationally, though
their distributional priors maybe difficult to infer. This series of experiments showed
that using this experimental design can provide at least some notion of what those
prior beliefs may look like for individuals.
Risk aversion should not influence decisions to remove the effects of ambiguity
at a cost, but individuals who exhibit greater risk aversion tend to sample more balls
from the urn. This result suggests that risk averse individuals may demand more
information even if that information is not linked with risk, but is instead linked
with ambiguity. The urn sampling experiment provides a measure different from
risk aversion. This other measure-this WTP to remove ambiguity-may be useful
in predicting behaviors that a simple measure of risk aversion cannot, or does so
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quite differently. The WTP to remove ambiguity and risk aversion coefficients may
measure very different things because the combined measures provide different bounds
on individual beliefs.
This study demonstrates support for a fairly common belief, that risk and
ambiguity are different from each other, though they may be correlated. The
experiment design used here, that isolates how individuals wrestle with ambiguity, has
provided a measure that may have predictive qualities even in a strategic setting. But
these results, though interesting and powerful, do raise more questions. Individual
aversion towards ambiguity is likely to matter for other behaviors, but what is the
extent of these effects? Is there a way to translate such a measure of WTP to remove
ambiguity to other settings? In the end this study suggests that ambiguity aversion
affects behaviors in a different manner than risk and it provides a manner by which
one can proxy for individual ambiguity aversion in laboratory settings by using the
WTP to remove ambiguity task design.
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CHAPTER III
DIFFERENCES IN COMPETITIVE CHOICES: PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK,
GENDER AND HORMONAL PHASE.
3.1 Introduction
Labor markets include a variety of different forms of compensation or competi-
tive environments. Firms may pay workers a flat rate, or instead they may incentivize
workers using a piece rate or through an economic contest, such as a rank-order
tournament (E.P. Lazear & S. Rosen 1981). These different forms of compensation
and contests are used in a variety of different markets with the motive being to
increase effort, output or performance or to sort high and low ability workers whose
types are unobservable.
Ability is not the only factor to influence this sorting. Females are significantly
less likely to choose a competitive tournament when given the choice between
a tournament or a piece rate form of compensation, even with no performance
differences (Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund 2007). It has been suggested that
both risk aversion and preference differences for competition are partly responsible
for these differences between the sexes, but the role that relative performance feedback
may have on these gender differences has not been explored. In this paper, I attempt
to answer whether differences in competitive environment selection are affected by
fully informing agents about their relative performance compared to other agents
they may compete against.
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To examme effects of relative performance feedback, I use an economic
experiment with two specific treatments to analyze the selection of competitive
environments. In the uninformed treatment, with no relative performance feedback,
subjects receive information only about their absolute performance from a previous
treatment in a real effort task. They do not receive any information about how
well any other participants performed. This uninformed treatment is followed
by an informed treatment, where subjects receive information about the previous
performance of all potential competitors along with their own performance. In both
treatments, subjects make choices across the same set of competitive environments;
thus, any differences in self selection between treatments may be attributed to the
role that relative performance feedback has in these decisions. I find that relative
performance feedback removes any systematic gender differences in the selection of
competitive environments.
The possible biological mechanisms behind these behavioral differences between
the sexes have only begun to be explored in economics. 1 Previous studies have
concluded that females and males have differences in preferences and behaviors for
competitive environments (Niederle & Vesterlund 2007), risk (P.J. Grossman & C.
Eckel 2003), and investment behavior (B.M. Barber & T. Odean 2001, G. Charness
& Uri Gneezy 2007). A possible biological basis for these differences comes in the
form of the hormonal differences between females and males. Females' hormones,
1 For a review combining findings in economics and psychology see Matsushita, Baldo, Martin
and Da Silva (2007).
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specifically steroid hormones, fluctuate a great deal and In a predictable manner
across the menstrual cycle.
The economic impacts of hormonal effects caused by the menstrual cycle are
potentially significant, but have only been studied in a few domains. For example,
Ichino and Moretti (2009) found that female worker absenteeism may be partly a
function of menstrual cycles. In this study, by scheduling females to participate in
two sessions, during both a low and high-hormone phase, I test whether hormonal
differences in females are related to competitive environment selection. I find that
females participating during the low-hormone phase are less likely to enter competitive
environments than females in a non-low-hormone phase of the menstrual cycle in the
treatment with no relative performance feedback. But as with the gender differences,
these selection differences are removed with relative performance feedback.
In the following section, I review the previous literature concerning competitive
environments and gender differences. I also review the literature and provide rationale
for why hormonal fluctuations may playa relevant role in competitive environment
selection for females. In section 3.3, I explain the experiment design and the
subsequent sections follow with results, a discussion, and ending with concluding
remarks.
3.2 Previous Literature
In examining the previous literature, I separate the two main areas of study:
competition and gender differences, and the effects of hormones on behavior. The
first section focuses on previous literature concerning competitive environments and
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gender differences. This section is then followed by the literature on the effects of
hormones in economic decision making.
3.2.1 Competition and Gender Differences
The corporate ladder can be considered a tournament where a number of
individuals compete for promotion based on the results of individual performance.
Females make up a small portion of top-level executive positions. Bertrand and
Hallock (2001) found that in 1997 the fraction of females in top level management
positions was 3% and only 15% of firms had at least one female in a top level
executive position. This underrepresentation of females in executive positions may be
partially explained by the roles that females have in the traditional family with the
raising of children affecting their career choices and human capital investments (S.W.
Polachek 1981). Part of this underrepresentation may be caused by a preference by
females to receive piece rate compensation. Jirjahn and Stephan (2004) find that
the attractiveness of piece rate schemes for females is likely caused by less wage
discrimination in such a setting when performance can easily be measured. It could
be for this reason that firms with a higher proportion of females are more likely to
offer piece rate compensation (C. Brown 1990).
The disproportionate number of females in high ranking executive positions
may also be a result of preference differences for competitive environments, or
lower performance gains for females from participating in tournament settings when
compared to males. A few other possible explanations exist for gender differences in
competitive environment selection. Tournament settings are more risky than piece
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rate settings, so the difference in self selection may stem from gender differences in
risk aversion. Another possibility is that females and males evaluate expected values
differently when the distributions of outcomes or potential competitors are ambiguous.
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) found, when given a choice between a piece rate
or a winner-take-all tournament compensation scheme, that females overwhelmingly
choose the piece rate while males choose the tournament. They infer that this gender
difference in selection is driven by men being overconfident and by differences in
preferences for competition between females and males. They find that the gender
differences for competition still remain even when they control for confidence and
risk aversion. Datta Gupta, Poulsen and Villeval (200.5) get similar results in an
experiment examining the effects of gender composition in tournaments. In another
experiment, Dohmen and Falk (2007) find that females are less likely to choose
variable pay schemes such as tournaments and piece rates when given the alternative
choice of a fixed rate for their time. All these experiments used a similar protocol
where subjects were given their absolute performance, but were never informed of
their relative standing within the group. These economic experiments have been
interpreted as meaning that gender differences in self selection are derived from a
preference difference where females seem to have a greater distaste for competition
than males. One should note that socialization may contribute to gender differences
in the selection of competitive environments as Gneezy et al. (2009) find that in a
matrilineal society women are more likely to compete than men.
One reason for these choice differences could be from a performance difference
between females and males. Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) find that females
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see lower performance gains from participating in competitive environments. In
observing children's performance in running races, Gneezy and Rustichini (2004)
also find that competition increases performance of boys, but not girls. In an
experimental setting, Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) find that for a mixed-
gender competitive environment, males have significant performance increases when
an environment is made more competitive and females do not. However, when
females compete only against other females, their performance increases as the
environment becomes more competitive. Gupta, Poulsen and Villeval (2005) find
that females are more competitive when given the opportunity to choose the gender
of a potential competitor. Specifically, females are more likely to choose to enter a
tournament if they first choose to be paired against another female before making
the competitive environment decision. These results suggest that performance in
competitive environments is different for males and females and that the gender
composition of groups may playa role in performance gains from competition, as
well as in the selection of competitive environments. Both performance differences
and gender composition effects may help explain the underrepresentation of females
in the corporate business world.
In another study, Niederle, Seagal and Vesterlund (2009) replicate previous
findings of gender differences for competitive environment selection, and then examine
the role of confidence and an affirmative action type of policy on these selection
differences. They find that while affirmative action policies change the composition
of the applicant pool, the overall number of high-performing participants is not
substantially affected. Thus, due to high-performing women coming in at the cost
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of high-performing men, the performance costs of selecting women over men by
affirmative action policies may be offset by these selection behaviors by high ability
individuals. These results suggest that affirmative action policies may remove gender
differences in the selection of competitive environments, and may not be costly, so
long as there are no ability differences between males and females.
Systematic differences between genders in risk aversion may also contribute
to differences in participation in competitive environments. Some studies find
that females are more risk averse than males though results are inconsistent in
laboratory settings (Grossman & Eckel 2003). These gender differences are not
entirely robust because subjects from non-western cultures, and children, appear to
not exhibit differences in risk preferences between the sexes (Charness and Gneezy
2007, Harbaugh et al. 2002). Risk aversion is a significant factor when making
a decision to enter a competitive environment; however, the competition studies
mentioned above control for risk aversion effects and gender differences still remain.
Another factor that may contribute to gender differences in tournament selection
may be ambiguity aversion. In the experiments that found gender differences
in competitive environment selection, individuals had little information about the
performance distribution that they must consider in calculating the probability of
winning the tournament. But ambiguity aversion differences have not been found to
occur systematically between the genders. Moore and Eckel (2003) find that females
are more ambiguity averse for specific contexts and domains. On the other hand,
Borghans et al. (2009) find that males are initially more ambiguity averse than
females, but as ambiguity increases, males and females behave similarly.
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Previous studies have found gender differences in the selection of competitive
environments. The possibility exists that these gender differences in competitive
environment selection are driven by biological factors. In the following section, I
explore why hormones may also playa pivotal role in these decisions.
3.2.2 Hormones: Why might they matter?
A biological basis for differences in preferences and behaviors between the
sexes may be due to hormonal differences between men and women. In addition to
differences in hormone levels, females experience large and fairly predictable steroid
hormonal fluctuations across the menstrual cycle. Steroid hormones have been found
to matter for behaviors and economic outcomes in other contexts. Testosterone levels
of financial traders in the morning can predict profitability through the rest of the
day. Also, cortisol levels in these same traders were found to rise with increased
volatility in their market returns (JM Coates & J. Herbert 2008). Testosterone levels
are correlated with behaviors in economic experiments such as offers and acceptances
in ultimatum games (T.C. Burnham 2007). Oxytocin has been shown to encourage
generosity levels and trust in individuals (Kosfeld et a1. 2005, Zak et a1. 2005).
Furthermore, through intranasal administration of oxytocin combined with fMRI
scans, it was found that oxytocin reduces activation in specific areas of the brain
related to fear processing and information feedback response (Baumgartner et al.
2008). Estradiol can increase power motivation-a preference for having an impact
or dominance over individuals-in females suggesting that it may affect competitive
appetites for females (S.J. Stanton & O.c. Schultheiss 2007).
46
Premenopausal females not using hormonal contraceptives experience significant
fluctuations in hormones. Estrogen, progesterone, follicle-stimulating hormone
(FSH), and luteinizing hormone (LH) all have a consistent pattern for normal cycling
females. Estrogen and progesterone have received most of the attention in studies
examining neuroendocrinological, psychological and behavioral effects. As shown
in Figure 5, both estrogen and progesterone remain low during the early part of
the menstrual cycle. This first week of the cycle is when normal cycling females
menstruate and can be considered a low-hormone phase. Estrogen rises quickly and
spikes just prior to ovulation. This rise is referred to as the follicular spike as it
occurs during the follicular phase, which is just prior to ovulation. After ovulation
(approximately day 14 in the graph), progesterone levels spike in the latter half of
the female menstrual cycle, which is called the luteal phase. During the luteal phase,
females who ovulate experience heightened levels in both estrogen and progesterone.
This second spike in both hormones may be referred to as the luteal spike or high-
hormone phase (Stricker et al. 2006, Speroff and Fritz 2005).
Hormonal contraceptives cause major changes in the hormonal fluctuations that
occur across the natural menstrual cycle. Females using a hormonal contraceptive
experience suppression of endogenous hormone production when in the active phase
of their contraceptive regimen (L. Speroff & M.A. Fritz 2005). Both progesterone and
estrogen levels remain fairly constant as the body receives a dose of these hormones
exogenously (Aden et al. 1998). During the placebo or non-active phase of the
contraceptive regimen there are no exogenous hormones being provided to the body;
this exogenous lowering of both progesterone and estrogen leads to withdrawal bleeding
----- ------
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FIGURE 5. Hormones in Normal Cycling Females
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caused by the withdrawal of exogenous hormones (Speroff & Fritz 2005). Interestingly,
there is no biological or medical necessity to induce this withdrawal bleeding (FD
Anderson & H. Hait 2003). This is made apparent in the following quote from one of
the leading textbooks on clinical gynecologic endocrinology.
Monthly bleeding, periodic bleeding, or no bleeding~this is an individual
woman's choice (Sperofj fj Pritz 2005, 908).
It is believed that keeping withdrawal bleeding as part of the hormonal contraceptive
regimen was a marketing ploy to make the birth control pill seem more socially
acceptable (E.M. Coutinho & S.J. Segal 1999). Thus, females could entirely
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avoid hormonal fluctuations by sustained contraceptive use. Indeed, some forms of
contraception do ensure that this occurs (Anderson & Hait 2003). If the decrease
in hormones affects females in an costly manner then one could expect that there is
some demand to prolong contraceptive use among the female population.
Neuroendocrinology has demonstrated the existence of hormonal effects on brain
activity. Results show that major depression may be linked to reduced density of
hydroxytryptamine (5-HT), also know as serotonin, binding sites (Malison et al.
1998). By injecting estradiol in rats, Fink et al. (1996) find that estrogen stimulates
an increase in the density of 5-HT binding sites in certain areas of the brain. Injections
of estradiol significantly increase the density of binding sites in the anterior cingulate
cortex (24%), anterior frontal cortex (41%) and the nucleus accumbens (12%). These
areas of the brain have been variously linked with mood, memory, and the anticipation
and receipt of monetary rewards (Fink et al. 1996, McEwen 2002, Bethea et al. 2002,
Platt and Huettel 2008). Progesterone has been shown to inhibit neurotransmission,
and as a result it may decrease anxiety and increase sedation (E.L. Vliet 2001). Other
research suggests that progesterone may decrease the degradation of 5-HT (Bethea
et al. 2002).
Hormonal fluctuations occur across the female menstrual cycle and contribute
to premenstrual syndrome effects, which may have significant economic consequences.
Ichino and Moretti (2009) use detailed employee attendance data from a large Italian
bank and find that absences for females below the age of 45 tend to occur according
to a 28 day cycle. These 28-day cycle absences explain about one-third of the
gender gap in employment absences at the firm. The female menstrual cycle is
49
approximately 28 days and they focus on females below the age of 45, who are more
likely to be premenopausal. Ichino and Moretti's result provides support for hormonal
fluctuations of the menstrual cycle having significant economic effects.
Using economic experiments, Chen et al. (2005) explore hormonal differences
as determinants of economic behaviors. They focus on behavioral differences between
males and females in first-price auctions. They find that males and females behave
differently only when females are in a phase of the menstrual cycle that provides
heightened levels of estrogen. In contrast, Pearson and Schipper (2009) find that
women bid higher than men only during the menstrual and premenstrual phases of
the cycle when estrogen levels are lower.
Not all economIC studies have found support for hormonal effects being
significant in economic decision making. Zethraeus et al. (2009) examine 200 post-
menopausal women in a double-blind study. Participants were given either estradiol
(2 mg), testosterone (40 mg) or a placebo daily for a four week period. Then they
participated in an economic experiment session that included a variety of different
tasks looking at risk aversion, altruism, reciprocal fairness, trust and trustworthiness.
No significant differences were found when comparing the behaviors between the three
different treatment groups of females.
In the following section, I explain the experimental design used to examine both
the effects of relative information and hormones on competitive environment selection.
- --- . __._-----------
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3.3 Experiment Design
Previous experimental studies have concluded that preference differences for
competition may be driving differences in selection for competitive environments by
males and females. I use an experiment design to test whether preference differences
are the main source of these gender differences. Use of a partial information treatment
and a full information treatment creates an opportunity to observe the role that
relative information may play in the selection of competitive environments.
Furthermore, no economic research has been done to examine the possible effects
of hormonal fluctuations across the menstrual cycle and competitive environment
selection. Therefore, the experiment design includes specific recruiting and scheduling
to attempt to have subjects participate in two sessions; for females these sessions were
to occur during both a low and high hormonal phase of the menstrual cycle. I also
include females taking hormonal contraceptives since females may alter hormonal
fluctuations by taking a hormonal contraceptive. For females using hormonal
contraception, during the placebo phase of the hormonal contraception regimen, their
hormone levels are the same as normal cycling females in the low-hormone phase of
their cycle. This design allows for the comparison of behaviors between females in
the low phase to those not in the low phase, while also comparing the behavior of
male participants.
In this study, most subjects participated in two separate competitive task
sessions. One session involved a word task and the other session involved a math
task. There were multiple reasons to try to have subjects participate in two sessions.
------ ----------
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The first reason was to examine whether females select competitive environments
differently conditional on being in a high or low phase during their menstrual cycle.
The second reason behind the two sessions and two separate types of tasks was to
observe whether gender differences for competitive environments exist regardless of
the type of task. Two sessions of participation also provided the opportunity to
observe the stability of gender differences for similar competitive environments.
In experiment sessions, participants performed math and word based tasks
requiring the exertion of real effort in five different treatments. In the first treatment,
participants performed the task under a piece rate compensation scheme, which was
non-competitive, since it was entirely dependent on the individual's performance
in the task. In the second treatment, participants performed the task under a
tournament scheme, they were randomly assigned to a winner-take-all tournament
with a size of 2, 4 or 6 total competitors. This second treatment provided participants
with experience in a randomly chosen competitive environment in which their pay
depended on their own performance as well as the performance of others. In the
third treatment, participants performed the task under a group-pay treatment. This
treatment randomly paired participants with another participant and their total
group production was split evenly between the two group members. This third
treatment could be considered the least competitive since free-riding was a possibility
for participants. They could be paid more than the non-competitive piece rate scheme
so long as their partner's output was greater than their own.
These first three treatments were designed to provide participants with some
experience in all of the possible compensation schemes. In the final two treatments,
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they were able to choose between the piece rate, group pay, or any of the tournament
compensation schemes. In each of the first three treatments, participants were given
only their absolute performance, they were not informed of how productive other
participants in the session had been, or if they won or lost a tournament. In the
fourth treatment participants could choose between all of the possible compensation
schemes. These choices consisted of group pay, individual piece rate, or a winner-take-
all tournament consisting of 2, 4, or 6 total competitors. In the fourth treatment,
subjects were not informed of their relative performance compared to others in the
session.
In the fifth treatment, participants were first informed of how all individuals
in the session performed in the first treatment. They then chose between all the
possible compensation schemes for their performance in the fifth treatment. The
fifth treatment is used to examine whether gender differences that were previously
found in similar competition experiments (Niederle & Vesterlund 2007, N.D. Gupta,
A. Poulsen & M. Villeval 2005) were a result of preference differences, risk aversion,
overconfidence or different approaches to information processing between genders.
Providing complete relative performance information allowed participants to update
their beliefs accurately. If gender differences remain in this treatment then such
results provide support for the conclusions from previous experiments that observed
gender differences in selection for competitive environments are a result of preference
differences for competitive environments and risk.
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3.3.1 Tasks
Two different types of tasks were used for this study, a math-based task and
a word-based task. The math-based task was similar to the one used by Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007). In this task, participants are asked to add four randomized
two-digit numbers and complete as many of these summations as possible in a period
of four minutes. Equations are presented to participants on a computer screen and
they simply type in the answer and press the Enter key or click a Submit button on
the screen. After each submission participants are promptly shown the next equation
to solve. On the screen, the equations look similar to the following:
12 + 57 + 48 + 52 = (3.3.1)
In the experiment, a sheet of paper and a pencil were provided to all participants to
use for this task, but no other form of assistance was provided.
The word-based task was similar to one used by Gunther et a1. (2008). In this
task, participants are shown a letter on a computer screen and have four minutes to
form as many unique words as possible that begin with that specific letter. The letter
remains on the screen for the entire four minutes and participants enter in their word
submissions in a text box below the letter. The attempted word formations are then
listed below the text box to help subjects minimize duplicate answers as duplicate
answers are counted as being incorrect. Common place names (cities, countries) are
acceptable, but proper names are counted as incorrect. Plural and tense changes
to root words are counted as separate and correct answers so long as these words
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still begin with the appropriate letter. In the experiment, participants were informed
of the rules in advance of beginning the task. All participants were informed that
everybody in the same session and same treatment received the same letter; thus,
providing them with a task of equivalent difficulty for each treatment.
A select group of letters was used for this study to limit the variation of difficulty
between treatments and sessions. The word list used for grading words is a common
English word list used by open source word processors.2 The letters chosen for the
study had between 2.7% to 3.8% of all words in the word list beginning with these
letters. The letters used are listed below with the percentage of words beginning with
the letter in parentheses:
E (3.8%)
I (3.6%)
F (3.3%)
L (2.7%)
G
N
(3.0%)
(3.5%)
H (3.7%)
o (3.5%)
3.3.2 Compensation schemes
}or the piece rate compensation, the payoff an individual receives is equal to the
piece rate multiplied by the production of the individual for that particular treatment.
To mitigate differences in the payoffs between math and verbal based sessions, the
payouts were slightly different for word tasks compared to math tasks. Payoffs for
both the math and verbal tasks were calculated in a similar manner though the
base rate, in the form of the piece rate (w) was different for word formation tasks
(ww = $0.25) and math addition tasks (wm = $0.50).
2Spell Checking Oriented Word Lists (SCOWL), Revision 6, August 10, 2004 by Kevin Atkinson.
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Suppose Wi is the total payoff from a treatment for individual i and Yi is the
output of the individual and Y-i is the output of the other individual of interest that
may have affect the payoff for individual i. In a binary group pay situation, individual
-i is the group member that is paired with individual i. For group pay, the payoff
for individual i and symmetrically for individual -i is:
(3.3.2)
In a tournament situation, if an individual has the best performance in his tournament
then he receives the piece rate multiplied by the size of the tournament, multiplied
by his individual performance. If an individual does not have the best performance
in his tournament then he receives nothing. In the event of a tie, in terms of best
performance, the individual receives a fraction of the tournament winnings based on
the number of individuals he tied with. One should note that individuals were not
informed about whether they won or lost a tournament until all five treatments were
complete.
Individuals were informed that they could be randomly grouped with individuals
that did not necessarily choose the same compensation option. This design creates a
greater incentive for high ability individuals to choose a more competitive environment
as there is a positive probability that they may compete against lower ability
individuals. As well, this design creates an incentive for low ability individuals to
choose group pay as there is a positive probability that they may be matched with a
high ability individual; thus, increasing their expected payoffs.
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3.4 Results
Experiment sessions took place in a computer lab at a large public university.
Potential participants completed a screening survey online and were then scheduled
for the first of two sessions. One of the two sessions involved a math-based task and
the other session involved a word-based task.
TABLE 10. Summary of Attendees
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Age 20.5 2.81 18 33 344
Years PS 2.19 1.48 0 6 343
GPA 3.28 0.47 2 4.22 343
Live Independently 0.82 0.38 0 1 345
Word task 0.48 0.5 0 1 345
Session Size 14.54 4.15 7 21 345
Second session 0.37 0.48 0 1 345
Female 0.5 0.5 0 1 345
Low Phase 0.14 0.34 0 1 345
Psych meds 0.08 0.28 0 1 343
The majority of participants were university students; the summary statistics for
this standard student sample are in Table 10. The average size of the 26 experiment
sessions was 14.5 participants with a standard deviation of 4.15. The word task was
used in 12 of the sessions while the math task was used in 14 sessions. Of the 345
individual subject sessions, 165 involved the use of the word task and 180 used the
math task,3 Approximately half the sample consists of females (172) and 37% (126)
of the sample consists of individuals that attended a second session. Based on self
30ne individual (female) was removed from the data due to a lack of understanding of the stimuli.
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reported data, 47 of the individual participants were females in the low-hormone
phase of their menstrual cycle.
TABLE 11. Individual and Session Characteristics
Sex
Male
Female
Total
I Age
20.69
20.32
20.50
Years PS
2.14
2.24
2.19
CPA
3.24
3.32
3.28
Indep.
0.84
0.81
0.82
Psych
0.10
0.07
0.08
Word
0.47
0.48
0.48
Size
13.79
15.30
14.54
Sess. 2
0.37
0.36
0.37
Table 11 shows that the males and females who participated were not noticeably
different from each other. The one exception was that the average female participated
in a session that was approximately larger by 1.5 individuals. In sessions, the female
to male ratio ranged from 0.3 to 2.3. On average the female to male ratio per session
was 1.01. Thus, all sessions had some degree of gender mix and on average this gender
mix was approximately 1 to 1.
Sessions took place three to four times a week and were held in the morning.
Sessions took slightly less than an hour, including approximately 10 minutes at the
beginning of the session that were used for participants to wait together in a foyer. The
reason for this initial wait period was to allow participants to see that sessions included
both males and females. Once participants entered the lab, partitions were used so
that participants could not see each other's computer screens or facial responses from
the feedback received. Competition and group membership were also anonymous
because subjects were unable to know with whom they were paired or with whom
they were competing against.
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TABLE 12. Payouts by Task Type
Type mean sd min max N
Math 7.38 11.31 0 84 180
Word 15.01 18.90 0 111 165
Total 11.03 15.86 0 111 345
The summary statistics for payouts for task performance are shown in Table
12. These payouts were based on one randomly chosen treatment and do not include
the participation fee given to all participants. 4 The word task paid substantially
more than the math task. This difference was mainly due to the word task being
substantially easier than the math task, despite the different wage used.
Participants who attended two sessions were subsequently asked to perform a
risk aversion task similar to that used in Holt and Laury (2002). The risk aversion
tasks were performed a few days after the second session to try to avoid endogeneity
with the competition task performance. A total of 112 participants (56 male and
56 females) participated in the risk aversion task. The average payout for the risk
aversion task was $6.57. Thus, an individual who participated in two sessions and
the risk aversion task received an average payout of $38.95 for approximately 2 hours
of time.
4The participation fee was $5 or $10 depending on the individual.
L- . _ ..
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3.4.1 Task Performance
Each individual (in both word and math task sessions) participated in five
different treatments of tasks. All participants in the session started the tasks at the
same time as everyone else and had four minutes to complete the task. For the first
three treatments, the compensation schemes were as follows:
Treatment 1: Piece rate ($0.50 per sum and $0.25 per word).
Treatment 2: Random sized tournament of 2, 4, or 6 individuals (the winner earned
the piece rate multiplied by the size of tourney).
Treatment 3: Group pay: an individual was paired with a randomly chosen partner
and the total production of the 2 individuals was split evenly and multiplied by
the piece rate.
TABLE 13. Performance Across Treatments and Gender
Math T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 Word T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
Male 10.9 12.1 12.3 12.7 12.8 Male 38.2 39.4 43.0 45.3 47.0
Female 9.9 11.4 11.8 12.3 12.1 Female 41.0 41.1 45.0 48.4 47.3
Both 10.4 11.8 12.0 12.5 12.5 Both 39.6 40.3 44.0 46.9 47.1
Table 13 provides mean performance for each treatment for both math and
word of tasks. According to the mean values, some learning seems to occur in both
the math and the word tasks. This learning appears to be limited to the first three
treatments. Table 13 also provides mean performance levels for both males and
females for math and word tasks across the five treatments. The gender difference for
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performance in the math task is only significant in Treatment 1 at the 10% leveP In
the word task the differences in performance are not statistically significant for any of
the treatments. Thus, there are no noticeable performance differences between males
and females after the first treatment. 6
3.4.2 Performance
The main focus of this study is on the compensation choices that individuals
made in the experiment; however, these choices may have been affected by per-
formance differences. This section focuses on task performance for the different
treatments. To consider how individuals are affected by the different incentives of
each type of compensation, I focus on the performance of individuals in the first
three treatments. In these first three treatments, individuals had no choice over the
type of compensation they received for their efforts; thus, the performance effects
from different compensation environments are exogenously determined.
According to the theory of piece rates and tournaments, one would expect
greater effort for a higher piece rate. Similarly, an individual of higher ability
and higher probability of winning should increase effort in a tournament. As the
tournament gets larger and more competitive, one would expect that individuals
would increase effort or set their effort levels to zero. Before considering the effects of
51-tailed t-test
6The analysis of the performance effects that occur from learning and different competitive
settings are explored in Section 3.4.2.
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tournament size on effort, I first focus on possible order effects and gender differences
between treatments.
The regressions in Table 14 are used to consider gender differences in perfor-
mance, learning effects and the incentive effects of increasing tournament size. The
performance in the word task, but not the math task, is highly correlated with the
GPA of participants. Regression estimates for both word and math show an order
effect suggesting that subjects are learning' in the first three treatments. Regression
1 in Table 14 shows that the tournament size has a statistically significant positive
effect on individual performance in the math task. Increasing the competitiveness
of a compensation environment from the piece rate to a tournament size of 6 should
increase performance of an individual by 0.65 problems in a four-minute task. This
is an increase of 5.7% for the average individual. In columns 2, 4, and 5, categorical
variables are used to investigate whether tournament size is actually leading to the
increase or whether just competing against someone in a tournament of any size leads
to performance increases.
In the second column 111 Table 14, categorical variables were used for each
of the possible competitive environments, for group pay and for tournaments. To
test whether the tournament size matters a separate dummy variable, Tourney
(ts> 1) was used to identify if an individual had to compete against someone else.
This categorization created a separate baseline for tournaments consisting of six
individuals. Once controlling for tournament competition it was found that the size of
the tournament does not matter and that group pay performance is not significantly
different from the piece rate environment in the math task. There is also a positive
TABLE 14. Performance with No Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Math Math Word Word Low Math
Task Order 0.88 0.82 3.49 3.50 1.10
(0.09) (0.09) (0.39) (0.38) (0.11 )
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Tourney Size 0.13 0.04
(0.04) (0.15)
(***) ()
Tourney(ts> 1) 0.63 -0.16 1.18
(0.27) (1.02) (0.31)
(**) () (***)
Tourney Size=2 -0.07 2.08 -0.24
(0.38) (1.49) (0.42)
() () ()
Tourney Size=4 -0.21 0.22 -0.73
(0.37) (1.40) (0.45)
() () ()
Female -0.45 -0.46 2.31 2.29 0.44
(0.59) (0.59) (1.87) (1.88) (0.39)
() () () () ()
Years PS -0.50 -0.50 0.16 0.15 0.17
(0.29) (0.30) (0.87) (0.87) (0.23)
(*) (*) () () ()
Age 0.40 0.40 0.33 0.34 -0.07
(0.15) (0.15) (0.49) (0.49) (0.14)
(***) (***) () () ()
CPA -0.26 -0.26 6.60 6.57 0.32
(0.63) (0.64) (1.94) (1.95) (0.41)
() () (***) (***) ()
Constant 3.22 3.39 4.11 0.00 6.43
(3.42) (3.43) (11.57) (0.00) (2.58)
() () () () (**)
Letter Controls No No Yes Yes No
Observations 534 534 492 492 303
Number of id 178 178 164 164 101
R-sq 0.0745 0.0721 0.367 0.368 0.196
chi2 102.5 104.5 565.4 570.9 136.0
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
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effect for age as the average effect of a year of life leads to an increase in performance
in the math task of 0.5 problems, though this may be offset by further post-secondary
schooling. It is worth noting that overall the competitive environment and individual
characteristics explain very little of the variation in performance for the math task in
terms of goodness of fit measures such as R2 .
The results from the word task (Regressions 3 and 4) in Table 14 suggest
that neither the tournament nor tournament size increase performance. There is a
significant amount of learning that occurs with each treatment. GPA has a significant
positive effect in terms of performance. This likely occurs because an individual's
vocabulary expands with age and individuals with a higher GPA probably have richer
vocabularies than individuals with lower GPAs. More of the variation in performance
can be explained in regressions using the word task than the math task; this mainly
stems from the inclusion of control variables for the random letters used for each task.
The math task results suggest that being in a tournament does increase
performance, but the size of the tournament is irrelevant. One might expect that
only high ability individuals would increase performance from the incentive effects
from being in a tournament, but I find the opposite. In splitting the sample for
high and low ability individuals, according to their performance in the first task and
whether they are above or below the median, I find that the low ability individuals
increase performance in response to being in a tournament (significant at 1%) in
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the math task. I find no significant effects from tournament SIze for high ability
individuals in the math task. 7
The competitiveness of the environment has a significant impact on performance
only in math tasks and once an individual is participating in a tournament, then the
number of competitors does not lead to further performance benefits. Competitive
environments (tournament size) had no influence on the performance of individuals in
the word task. Thus, depending on the type of task, competition between individuals
may increase performance. Therefore, due to mixed results, one cannot conclude that
tournament size increases performance or effort of agents.
Overall, I find that a more competitive work environment may not lead to
performance increases as the incentive effects of competitiveness are not robust across
different types of tasks. Another important result shown by these regressions is
that there are no significant performance differences between males and females. In
terms of performance effects, some learning occurs across the different treatments
and only low ability individuals tend to increase performance when they are put in a
tournament of any size- it is enough to be competing against someone.
As in other experiments that used similar tasks, there are no significant
performance differences between males and females. This lack of difference suggests
that both males and females should select into competitive environments in a a similar
fashion, but I find that this is not necessarily the case. These selection differences are
discussed in the following section.
7The estimation results for high ability individuals are not shown here, but none of the competitive
environment variables were significant in these estimations.
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3.4.3 Gender Differences in Compensation Choice
Previous experiments have found that females are less likely than males to
enter tournament environments when given the option between a tournament and
piece rate. To test whether these prior results can be replicated with this protocol,
I first focus on choices made in Treatment 4. In this treatment, as in most previous
studies, individuals were not given information about their relative performance
against possible competitors from previous treatments.
FIGURE 6. Choices without Information by Gender and Session
Compensation Choice Differences Before Feedback by Gender and Session
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Most individuals participated in two sessions. Figure 6 shows the histograms
of the choices made by males and females in first and second sessions for Treatment
4. Both males and females behaved in a consistent manner in both sessions. The
gender differences are large when no relative performance information was provided
as over 53% of males in both sessions chose to compete in tournaments while only
approximately only 30% of females select tournaments.
FIGUR.E 7. Choice Differences by Gender and Information
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Figure 7 shows the effect of relative performance feedback on competitive
environment choices, which are aggregated by gender. In Treatment 4, subjects
received no relative performance information; in Treatment 5, subjects received
relative performance feedback prior to making their choices. Females tend to have
an almost uniform distribution across choices as the proportions selecting group
pay, piece rate, tournament are not significantly different from each other in both
treatments. Females tend to select the piece rate more than the tournament or group
pay, but this difference is not statistically significant. Females, when compared to
males, systematically choose not to enter tournaments without relative performance
information. Instead, females select both group pay and piece rate significantly more
than males in Treatment 4. Thus, this treatment of no relative information replicates
earlier findings while having an additional possible choice in the form of group pay.
The right side of Figure 7 shows that males select competitive environments
quite differently when they have relative performance information about potential
competitors. There is a significant increase in the proportion of males choosing
the piece rate (5% level) and group pay (10% level), and a significant decrease
in the proportion of males choosing the tournament (5% level). After receiving
the relative performance information, the proportions of males and females have
no statistically significant differences between them at the 5% level.8 Relative
performance information seems to remove any gender differences in competitive
environment selections.
8At a 10% significance level there is a difference in the piece rate selection between males and
females.
-----------_. --_.
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While there are no significant differences in performance between males and
females, other factors such as age and GPA may play important roles in the output
of individuals. If performance is affected by such factors, then individuals' choices to
enter different competitive environments may also be affected by them. Therefore,
it is important to test whether these gender differences in selection for Treatment 4
remain after controlling for these other potentially relevant factors.
Table 15 shows the results from ordered probit estimations from Treatment 4.
Columns 1 to 3 use CompScale as the dependent variable where group pay is equal to
-1, piece rate is equal to 0, and a selection of a tournament of any size is categorized
as 1. As long as this ordinal ranking holds in terms of a dimension of competitiveness
then this categorical variable can be properly used in an ordered probit estimation.
Table 15 shows that the results of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) are replicated
in the treatment without relative performance feedback: females choose to not
enter competitive environments as frequently as males, even when controlling for
individual confidence (Confidence(Tl)) and relative rank of performance within the
session (%-tile Rank(Tl)) from the first treatment. This is shown by the negative
significant coefficient for the female dummy variable (Female) in columns 1 through
3. Confidence is measured by the predicted performance an individual has at the
end of Treatment 1 (prior to finding out their actual performance) divided by the
individual's prediction of the average performance of all session participants. To
control for performance, I use the relative rank from Treatment 1.9 Both confidence
gIn regressions, performance from the math task (word task) explains over 67% (57%) of the
variation in the percentile rank in the math task (word task). The difference between the math and
word task is likely attributed to the random assignment of letters for tasks.
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TABLE 15. Ordered Probit: Choices with No Information
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled RE RE Risk
VARIABLES CompScale CompScale CompScale
Female -0.36 -0.40 -0.49
(0.13) (0.15) (0.19)
(***) (***) (**)
Confidence(Tl) 0.86 0.98 0.99
(0.25) (0.29) (0.34)
(***) (***) (***)
Improve (T2) 0.61 0.72 0.73
(0.20) (0.23) (0.32)
(***) (***) (**)
%-tile Rank (Tl) 1.05 1.08 0.85
(0.23) (0.26) (0.32)
(***) (***) (***)
Risk Controls No No Yes
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes
observations 343 343 224
11 -336.6 -335.6 -212.3
chi2 66.91 61.00 48.81
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
and the percentile rank from treatment one are positively correlated with the selection
of more competitive environments. Improvement in task performance between the
first and second task (Improve(T2)) also has a significant positive effect on choosing
a more competitive environment in Treatment 4.
Table 15 shows that females are less likely to enter into competitive environ-
ments even when controlling for confidence, performance, improvement and some
individual specific characteristics such as the number of years of college education,
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usage of psychological medication, GPA and age. The results are similar when using a
random effects ordered probit as shown in column 2. The possibility exists that gender
differences in the self selection of competitive environments are in part attributed
to risk aversion. Column 3 includes measures of risk aversion for individuals that
participated in a task similar to the one used by Holt and Laury (2003). I find that
risk aversion is not significantly correlated with competitive environment choice.
3.4.4 Do Differences in Choices Exist with Information?
With no information concerning the quality of potential competitors, females
choose to enter less competitive environments than males, irrespective of confidence,
performance, improvement or risk aversion. These gender differences do not
seem to be related to risk or overconfidence suggesting that these differences are
related to preference differences for competition. If a preference difference for
competitive environments exists then providing information about the quality of
possible competitors might reduce mistakes in selections of environments that are
too competitive or not competitive enough, but this information should not reduce
the gender differences in choices. If females dislike competitive environments more
than males then there should still be a negative gender effect for females once both
males and females are informed of the quality of possible competitors in Treatment
5.
In Treatment 5, before choosing the competitive environment, individuals are
shown a list of the performance of all the participants in the session from Treatment
1. This information provides a signal of the quality of competitors that participants
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may compete against if they choose to enter a tournament setting. Or, alternatively,
a signal of the quality of person they may be paired with if they choose group pay.
Table 16 shows the results from two different types of ordered probit estimations
for Treatment 5 where individuals receive relative performance information prior to
making choices about compensation. The table shows that females do not make
significantly different choices than males for a number of different specifications.
Columns 1 and 2 provide estimates using CompScale as the dependent variable, where
there are only three dimensions, group pay, piece rate, and tournament. Using this
dependent variable, I find there are no differences between males and females in the
selection of competitive environments. The selection of competitive environments is
mainly dependent on the relative performance information provided prior to making
the decision and an individual's improvement from Treatment 1 to Treatment 2. Risk
aversion control variables are not significantly related to whether an individual chooses
a tournament, piece rate, or group pay compensation scheme. Though, the sample of
individuals that participated in the risk aversion task, whether due to risk aversion
controls or sample differences, seem to not be affected by improvement between tasks
to the same degree (as magnitude and significance are both lower) as the rest of the
sample. The one variable that consistently matters for individuals in this treatment
is their percentile rank in Treatment l.
There are no significant diff'erences between females' and males' selections of
competitive environments in Treatment 5 when individuals were fully informed of
their relative performance compared to potential competitors. The lack of differences
between males and females in this treatment raises questions about the existence and
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TABLE 16. Ordered Probit: Choices with Information
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled RE RE Risk
VARIABLES CompScale CompScale CompScale
Female 0.00 -0.02 0.13
(0.13) (0.18) (0.21 )
0 0 ()
Confidence (Tl) 0.34 0.44 0.65
(0.24) (0.30) (0.35)
() () (*)
Improve (T2) 0.81 1.01 0.65
(0.20) (0.26) (0.32)
(***) (***) (**)
%-tile Rank (Tl) 2.17 2.59 2.31
(0.25) (0.34) (0.37)
(***) (***) (***)
Risk Controls No No Yes
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 343 343 224
11 -320.6 -316.7 -194.5
chi2 110.9 98.51 79.67
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.OI, ** p<0.05, * p<O.1
sources of gender differences for competitive environments. This effect of information
suggests that, relative to males, females may be less likely to compete when they lack
knowledge about the quality of the competition. In the section below, I consider the
costs of the selection differences between men and women when they lack information
about the quality of competitors and whether there are gender differences according
to ability levels.
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3.4.4.1 The Cost of Gender Differences Choices
To compare the costs of gender differences for competitive environments, I
approach the problem as having each individual maximize expected value. This
approach does not take into account risk aversion, but focuses on the dollar costs of
suboptimal choices. In the case where there is no relative performance information, if
females are making compensation choices by avoiding tournaments for promotion
then these selections may be costly. The results have shown that with poor
relative performance information, females select not to enter tournaments, while
males overwhelmingly select to enter tournaments. Both types of selections may
be suboptimal as males may select competitive environments too much and females
may be selecting tournaments too little.
3.4.4.2 Expected Value of Choices
To maximize expected value from choosing to compete in a tournament, or to
accept the piece rate, or to select the group pay scheme, an individual cares about his
probability of winning a tournament and his expected output. Expected values are
based on the performance from Treatment 1 and the improvement of the individual
from repeating the task and being in a tournament in Treatment 2. 10 Assume an
exogenous probability of winning a two person tournament in the form the percentile
rank from Treatment 1 for the individual. If the individual is the best in the session
then he receives a probability of winning a tournament of 0.99 and if he is the worst
lOFor simplicity, the incentive effects of effort from entering a tournament are ignored in calculating
these expected values.
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performing individual in the group his probability of winning is set to 0.01. Let
this rank be equal to p. An individual's probability of winning an n person sized
tournament is then pn-l. Let b be the base piece rate and y be the expected output
of the individual, then the expected value of an n person tournament is:
(3.4.1)
This expected value form includes the piece rate which is the equivalent of a
tournament size of 1. For group pay selection, assume that an individual accurately
predicts the mean performance of the group. If an individual expects his output to
be lower than the group average and if his probability is less than ~ then he should
. 2
choose the group pay compensation scheme. Otherwise the rank ordering for the
different sized tournaments in terms of expected values is as follows:
EV(; ~ E\i4
E\i4 ~ EV6
EV2 ~ EV4
EVi ~ EV2
if y > fl and p ~ yfj
if y > fl and p :S yfj
if y > fl and p :S VI
if y > fl and p :S ~
(3.4.2)
EVcrp ~ EVn ify:S fl, Vn E {1,2,4,6}
3.4.5 Costly Choices
In this experiment, high ability individuals and low ability individuals make
choices about the form of compensation they will receive. To maximize the returns
from effort, a high ability individual should choose a more competitive environment
------------------------------ --
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while a low ability individual should choose a less competitive environment. An
individual should choose a more competitive environment the higher that individual's
relative ability is compared to the group of possible competitors. This choice
should occur because a higher ability individual is more likely to win a tournament.
Furthermore, in this experiment there is an even greater incentive for choosing a
tournament for high ability individuals because individuals that choose to compete in
a tournament may be randomly chosen to compete against individuals of lower ability
who did not choose to enter the tournament. Thus, this framework is structured
towards having higher ability individuals choose a more competitive tournament and
lower ability individuals to choose a piece rate or group pay form of compensation.
Table 17 shows the average expected value losses for suboptimal selections by
males and females in Treatment 4. Each row represents an actual decision that was
made by individuals, while each column represents the optimal decision that should
have been made. For example, the first row and column section (Grp Loss, Grp) cell
shows the average loss for individuals that selected the group pay and should have
selected group pay. In this case, the optimal choice was group pay and the average
loss from optimally choosing group pay is zero. In contrast, under column 6 (for the 6
person sized tournament), the average expected value loss was 19.82 for males whose
optimal choice would have been to choose a tournament of six, but who chose group
pay instead.
In Treatment 4, the average expected value loss of selection mistakes was 4.91
for males and 6.78 for females.u These loss differences are mostly driven by high
llThis difference is significant at a 10% level using a I-tailed test.
TABLE 17. Treatment 4 Selection Loss
Males Theatment 4 Selection Loss
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Optimal Choice
Chosen Grp 1 2 4 6
Grp Loss 0 0.89 2.45 5.90 19.82
1 Loss 0.96 0 1.51 7.69 11.71
2 Loss 5.84 2.65 0 0.40 37.93
4 Loss 7.28 5.27 1.58 0 15.49
6 Loss 6.63 7.51 5.74 0.53 0
Avg Loss 2.42 2.97 2.31 3.29 12.60
Avg Loss
1.74
2.71
11.75
8.05
3.37
4.91
Females Theatment 4 Selection Loss
7.31
o
Chosen
Grp Loss
1 Loss
2 Loss
4 Loss
6 Loss
Optimal Choice
Grp 1 2 4 6
o 0.48 2.16 5.00 42.61
0.95 0 1.48 9.52 39.28
4.57 2.26 0 1.81
9.27 6.51 3.91 0
7.08 9.04 6.97
Avg Loss
5.18
9.98
3.19
5.51
5.43
Avg Loss 1.58 2.28 2.91 6.80 27.27 6.78
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ability females and to a lesser extent by low ability males. It becomes apparent
from examining column 6 for males and females, that high ability females (those who
should select a tournament size of 6) are making the costly choice of selecting group
payor piece rate. Females lose 27.30 in expected value compared to 12.60 for males.
In contrast, low ability males make more costly decisions than low ability females as
the females that should select group pay lose 1.58 while the low ability males lose
2.42 on average. I find that both high ability females and males are not entering
competitive environments enough. But these high ability females overwhelming
select the noncompetitive environments of piece rate and group pay, which are very
costly decisions. In contrast, too many low ability males are entering competitive
environments.
Table 18 shows that the relative performance feedback decreases the average
expected value losses for both males and females. In Treatment 5, there are no
longer significant differences in terms of expected value losses between males (3.95)
and females (4.80) from suboptimal choices. The decreases in expected value losses
are greatest for high ability females; their average expected value loss improved to
18.70 in Treatment 5 from 27.27 in Treatment 4. High ability males also made
more value maximizing decisions as the average expected value loss for males that
should have selected a tournament size of six improved to 10.98 in Treatment
5 from 12.60 in Treatment 4. Thus, high ability females are still not entering
competitive environments enough, but they are making better value maximizing
decisions when they receive relative performance information by entering more
competitive environments.
TABLE 18. Treatment 5 Selection Loss
Males Treatment 5 Selection Loss
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Optimal Choice
Chosen Grp 1 2 4 6
Grp Loss 0 0.49 2.27 7.52 7.53
1 Loss 1.28 0 1.63 6.02 21.29
2 Loss 6.39 2.16 0 32.88
4 Loss 5.76 5.52 2.93 0 10.20
6 Loss 5.16 9.59 6.64 0.77 0
Avg Loss 1.39 1.49 2.02 4.79 10.98
Avg Loss
0.84
4.54
8.61
7.59
2.55
3.95
Females Treatment 5 Selection Loss
Chosen
Optimal Choice
Grp 1 2 4 6 Avg Loss
Grp Loss
1 Loss
2 Loss
4 Loss
6 Loss
Avg Loss
o 0.46 1.80 4.65
0.85 0 1.74 8.18 32.34
4.24 2.65 0 5.57 18.51
7.32 6.35 3.39 0 11.39
6.68 4.22 3.33 0
0.88 1.88 2.21 5.93 18.70
0.46
7.77
6.99
6.27
2.64
4.80
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Low ability females and males tend to behave similarly after receiving the
relative performance information as more of them optimally select group pay. The
low ability females in the Treatment 4 lose (1.58) significantly less expected value
than males (2.42).12 Once these low ability individuals receive relative performance
information, they make decisions that increase expected value, but a gender difference
in terms of costs still remains as the expected value losses are 0.88 for low ability
females and 1.39 for low ability males. 13 Therefore, the costs of suboptimal selections
by both genders improve substantially with relative performance information.
Figure 8 provides the distributions of choices made by both high ability females
and high ability males. High ability is defined as an individual that should enter
a four person tournament and low ability is defined as someone who's performance
is below the median performance level of their respective session. Figure 8 shows
that the relative performance information leads to an increase in the proportion of
high ability females entering tournaments. Over 50% of high ability females enter
tournaments as compared to 31% without information. With information, fewer high
ability males enter tournaments (12% less), but this change in tournament selection
is not statistically significant (at 5% level). Relative performance information leads
to more high ability females entering tournaments.
Figure 9 shows that low ability males enter into more competitive environments
than females when they have no relative performance information. Once these low
ability males can make decisions using the relative performance information, the
121-tailed p=O.063
131-tailed p=O.097
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FIGURE 8. Information Effects for High Ability
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proportion in tournaments drops from 43% to 22%. The information leads to 51%
of these low ability males to select group pay, a significant increase from the 37%
observed without the relative performance information. In considering low ability
individuals, relative performance information mostly leads to more low ability males
moving out of tournaments and towards the group pay form of compensation while
low ability females exhibit little change.
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FIGURE 9. Information Effects for Low Ability
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High ability females select more competitive environments when given relative
performance feedback. Fewer high ability males select the tournament with
information, but on average the expected value loss is lower for high ability males
once they receive relative performance information. Females could still choose more
competitive environments, but the information has at least moved most high ability
females away from selecting group pay. Low ability males also exhibit large changes in
behavior after receiving the relative performance information as many of them switch
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away from choosing tournaments towards the optimal choice of group pay. Thus, the
relative performance information leads to more efficient sorting by both males and
females.
Without relative performance information, males and females select competitive
environments differently, but there are other possible biological reasons for differences
in choices within the female population. The following section will examine whether
the hormone phases of the menstrual cycle for women are correlated with competitive
environment choices. If there is a systematic relationship between phases, then this
may provide a further explanation for the drastic gender differences shown by females
choices in the treatment without relative performance information in this experiment.
3.4.6 Hormonal Effects for Competitive Environments
Normal cycling women experience large changes in hormones across the
menstrual cycle, and hormonal contraceptives alter the form of these fluctuations
for females. Both groups of females experience a low hormone phase, this is during
menses for normal cycling females and during the placebo phase (or non-use) for
females using a hormonal contraceptive. I exploit this change in hormones in both
groups of females to test whether hormonal fluctuations are related to competitive
environment choices.
Females using hormonal contraceptives experience more predictable hormonal
fluctuations than females who do not use hormonal contraceptives. Normal cycling
females, those not using hormonal contraceptives, tend to experience more noise in
the timing of their menstrual cycle period. Females using a hormonal contraceptive
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do not ovulate and during the off-week (or placebo phase) experience withdrawal
bleeding caused by low-hormone levels. Thus, the low-hormone phase for both
hormonal contraceptive users and normal cycling females occurs during the week
of their menstrual period or withdrawal bleeding.
To identify where each participating female was in her menstrual cycle, screening
and experiment session exit surveys were used. The screening survey was used to
schedule all female participants during both a low-hormone phase and high-hormone
phase. The high-hormone phase corresponds to the mid-luteal peak for normal cycling
females (Figure 5) or three days into contraceptive use for female using a hormonal
contraceptive. These phases were verified in the experiment exit survey that was filled
out by each participant as experiment payoffs were prepared. Accurate scheduling
of females according to their menstrual cycles was an important aspect of the study.
Thus, it was important to know the variability of participants' menstrual cycles, forms
of contraception used and start days of hormonal contraceptive regimens.
TABLE 19. Menstrual Cycle Regularity
Regularity of Period
Identical
Within 1-2 days
Within 3-7 days
Very Irregular (7+)
Total
Missed Period in Last 3 Months
Yes
No
Total
Percent
14.3%
42.3%
34.3%
9.1%
Percent
14.7%
85.3%
Count
55
163
132
35
385
Count
57
330
387
Numbers may not add up due to item non-response in screening survey.
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Table 19 provides a summary of the answers given by potential female
participants in the screening survey concerning the regularity of their menstrual
periods. Some females experience a large degree of variability in their menstrual
cycles. Of the females who completed the screening survey, almost 15% missed a
menstrual period during the previous 3 months. Consequently, scheduling around
predicted phases would not be accurate enough to identify hormonal phases. For this
reason, an exit survey was also used at the end of each experiment session to help
with identification of hormonal phases. 14
TABLE 20. Female Birth Control Use
Form of Birth Control
Abstinence
Pill
Condoms
Depo-provera
IUD*
Patch
Timing
Tubal Ligation
Vaginal Ring
Vasectomy
Other
None
Total
Percent
11.3%
48.7%
35.3%
0.8%
2.3%
0.0%
1.8%
0.3%
5.9%
0.3%
2.1%
19.3%
Count
44
189
137
3
9
o
7
1
23
1
8
75
497
Multiple responses were allowed.
*Intrauterine device
14Missed periods are a problem for identification purposes in normal cycling females as they imply
that a female may not have ovulated during that month, and thus did not experience a mid-luteal
peak in hormones. Furthermore, without a recent menstrual period, it is difficult to determine the
phase in the hormonal cycle.
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As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, hormonal contraceptives provide women with
a choice about whether to menstruate. Many females already use a hormonal
contraceptive to keep a regular and predictable menstrual period. 15 To understand
how widespread hormonal contraceptive use is, at least among college students,
consider the data in Table 20 obtained from females in the screening survey concerning
the forms of birth control used. Over 54% of females use some form of hormonal
contraceptive. Thus, over half the potential female participants could avoid the low-
hormone phase by not taking an off-week or placebo week as part of their hormonal
contraceptive regimen.
To help identify hormonal phases for females using a hormonal contraceptive,
the start day for hormonal contraceptive use was asked of all potential female
participants. Table 21 shows that females who completed the screening survey
overwhelmingly favor a Sunday start day for their hormonal contraceptive regimen.
This allows for easier predictability of low and high phases for these females as
hormonal fluctuations are exogenously determined by hormonal contraceptive use.
Figure 10 shows the distribution of choices of females across the three possible
competitive environments of group pay, piece rate and tournaments for Treatment
4, where participants had no relative performance information prior to making their
choices. The histogram includes all females that were able to attend two sessions and
could be identified as being in a low or non-low-hormone phase. Many of these females
15With hormonal contraception, the bleeding females experience is withdrawal bleeding and not
a menstrual period.
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TABLE 21. Hormonal Contraceptive Start Day
Start day
Sunday
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
Saturday
Total
Percent
51.7%
11.2%
8.3%
9.3%
8.8%
7.3%
3.4%
Count
106
23
17
19
18
15
7
205
were scheduled for both a predicted low and contrasting high hormonal phase. 16 The
figure suggests that low phase females are more likely to choose group pay and less
likely to choose tournaments in comparison to females in a non-low-hormone phase
when they have not received any relative performance feedback.
3.4.7 Performance differences by hormonal phase.
These differences in competitive environment choices between females in the low-
hormone phase and females in the non-low-hormone phase may be related to decreased
expected performance across the menstrual cycle or from different preferences for
competition in the math and word task. I find that, for the most part, there are no
significant performance differences between females in the low phase and those that
are not in the low phase. To examine performance differences across the menstrual
cycle, I consider the word and math tasks separately and estimate effects using linear
specifications similar to the ones used to examine exogenous performance effects of
16Due to the error in predicting the low phase some females were in a non-low phase for both
word and math tasks.
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FIGURE 10. Compensation Choice & Hormonal Phase for Females
Females Attending Two Sessions
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Error bars show standard errors.
tournaments. Table 22 provides the random effects OLS estimates for a number of
factors that may explain performance differences in both word and math tasks for all
treatments where the participants could not choose their competitive environments.
The estimations for math tasks are in columns 1 to 3 and the estimations for word
tasks are in columns 4 to 6.
There seems to be no correlation with the low-hormone phase and performance
III the word task (columns 4 to 6) for females. The Low Phase coefficient is
insignificant for all the different samples in the word task. Focusing on performance
------------
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in the math task (columns 1 to 3), there seems to be no effect from the low phase
in the sample of both females and males (column I), and only females (column 2).
There seems to be some effect for low phase females when including controls for risk
aversion for the portion of the particpants for which such measures were available.
On average, performance in the math task decreases by about 2.2 correct
answers for low phase females when controlling for risk aversion, which is a 20%
decrease for the average female. Though the low phase effect is only significant at the
10% level when taking into account individuals for which measures of risk aversion
can be used as controls, it still suggests that anticipated performance differences
may play some role in differences in selection exhibited by females in the low phase.
Therefore, if performance or confidence differences are driving selection differences,
then controlling for performance and confidence in a discrete choice model should
help isolate the effect of the low phase on selection choices.
TABLE 22. Hormonal Effects for Performance (t<4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All Female Female All Female Female
Task Math Math Math Word Word Word
VARIABLES RE RE RE Risk RE RE RE Risk
Task Order 0.87 0.94 1.01 3.46 3.92 3.09
(0.09) (0.13) (0.18) (0.39) (0.57) (0.70)
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Tourney Size 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.05 -0.03 -0.20
(0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.16) (0.23) (0.29)
(***) (**) 0 0 0 0
Low Phase -1.07 -1.09 -2.21 2.22 2.09 4.57
(0.98) (0.71) (0.89) (3.00) (2.98) (3.58)
0 0 (**) 0 0 0
Female -0.32 1.72
(0.67) (2.11)
0 0
Years PS -0.41 -0.70 -1.19 0.31 -0.87 -3.41
(0.30) (0.40) (0.52) (0.87) (1.39) (2.10)
0 (*) (**) 0 0 0
Age 0.38 0.55 0.89 0.31 1.48 3.52
(0.15) (0.23) (0.27) (0.49) (0.90) (1.22)
(**) (**) (***) 0 0 (***)
CPA -0.12 -0.43 -0.46 5.73 7.56 6.22
(0.65) (0.78) (1.03) (2.00) (3.19) (4.13)
0 0 0 (***) (**) 0
Psych meds -1.48 -0.88 -1.17 3.37 4.80 3.56
(1.10) (1.19) (1.65) (3.23) (4.95) (6.78)
0 0 0 0 0 0
Constant 3.26 0.78 -3.87 6.92 -18.13 -43.30
(3.47) (4.18) (5.28) (11. 70) (19.47) (26.05)
0 0 0 0 0 (*)
Letter Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Risk Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 510 237 147 471 225 147
Number of id 170 79 49 157 75 49
R-sq 0 0.0909 0.168 0.339 0.369 0.410 0.496
chi2 100.5 62.28 54.45 563.4 289.1 209.3
Standard errors in p'arentheses
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
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3.4.7.1 Differences Between Word and Math Tasks for Hormone Phases.
The distribution of choices made by females across the menstrual phase suggest
that hormonal phases may playa role in competitive choice differences within the
female population. Females in a specific hormonal phase may also experience greater
aversion to certain types of tasks; therefore, I examine whether females in the low-
hormone phase are more likely to choose group pay and less likely to choose a
tournament for both math and word tasks.
FIGURE 11. Choices by Phase for Females that Attended Both Sessions.
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Figure 11 provides histograms of females' choices by hormonal phase and task
type. The general pattern of low phase females is the same for females that participate
in word and math tasks during the low phase. Low phase females are more likely to
choose group pay and less likely to choose tournaments in both math and word tasks.
Non-low phase females, exhibit slightly different choices between math and word
tasks as they overwhelmingly select tournament in the math task, while in the word
task, tournament is still selected more than group pay, but piece rate is selected the
most. Non-low phase females consistently select group pay the least in both math and
word tasks, which is a direct contrast to females in the low-hormone phase. Subjects
alternated the type of task used in sessions; females that participated in a math or
word task during the low phase would then participate in the other type of when
not in the low phase, and vice-versa. The differences in selections between hormonal
phases suggest that these phases may be correlated with behavioral differences for
females.
3.4.7.2 Do Low Phase Females Make Different Choices?
Table 23 provides the results from ordered probit models for Treatment 4 choices
using the CompScale variable, which is an ordered categorical variable consisting of
the following categories: group pay, piece rate, and tournamentY I find that females
in the low phase choose to enter less competitive environments than females in a non-
17Estimations using the tournament size _ordered categorical variable that takes into account
further dimensions of competitiveness were not robust as significance for the low phase fluctuates
depending on the specification. Too few low phase females chose tournaments to allow for
disaggregation by tournament size.
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low phase. Without relative performance information, much of the difference between
genders seems to be driven by low phase females, who shy away from the competitive
environments of tournaments and choose the least competitive setting possible in the
form of group pay.
TABLE 23. Ordered Probit: Hormone Effects for No Relative Information
(Treatment 4)
Sample
VARIABLES
Female
Low Phase
Confidence (Tl)
Improve (T2)
%-tile Rank (Tl)
Risk Controls
Characteristic Controls
Observations
11
chi2
r2_p
(1)
All
Pooled
-0.26
(0.14)
(*)
-0.44
(0.21 )
(**)
0.81
(0.26)
(***)
0.60
(0.20)
(***)
0.97
(0.23)
(***)
No
Yes
328
-322.3
64.32
0.0907
(2)
All
RE
-0.29
(0.16)
(*)
-0.46
(0.22)
(**)
0.91
(0.30)
(***)
0.69
(0.23)
(***)
0.99
(0.26)
(***)
No
Yes
328
-321.7
58.60
(3)
Females Only
RE
-0.53
(0.26)
(**)
1.08
(0.54)
(**)
0.79
(0.38)
(**)
0.52
(0.43)
()
No
Yes
155
-156.0
19.76
(4)
Risk
RE
-0.26
(0.21 )
()
-0.76
(0.27)
(***)
0.90
(0.35)
(**)
0.72
(0.32)
(**)
0.72
(0.32)
(**)
Yes
Yes
211
-197.4
51.31
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
The total number of of low phase females that can be used for data analysis is 45.
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Table 24 provides the results from ordered probit estimations for Treatment 5,
where subjects were provided with relative performance information from Treatment 1
prior to making their competitive environment selections. The first column provides
pooled cross-sectional results including all subjects, the second to fourth columns
provide estimates from using a random effects ordered probit. The second column
includes all males and females, the third column consists of a female only sample
and the fourth column takes into account only males and females for which risk
aversion measures were available. The results in Table 24 show that when participants
are informed of their relative performance compared to other potential competitors
then there is little difference in selection between genders or across the menstrual
cycle. Once all participants are informed of the quality of possible competitors then
differences between genders and across the menstrual cycle become insignificant.
There is a cost associated with high ability individuals not entering competitive
settings and with low ability individuals not choosing less competitive settings. Low-
hormone phase females make more costly decisions compared to non-low phase females
and males when using expected value loss calculations. The expected value loss
compares the expected value of optimal competitive environment selection with the
actual selection expected value. 18 The average expected value losses for males, low
phase and non-low phase females in Treatment 4 are shown in Table 25. Treatment 4
is used because in Treatment 5 selection differences are insignificant. In Treatment 4,
low phase females sacrifice the greatest amount of expected value, $8.50 per decision.
The expected value losses for males and non-low phase females are respectively $4.91
18These expected values are calculated in the same way as discussed in the previous section.
---~----'------------
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and $6.52. The value difference between low and non-low phase females is not
statistically significant and the difference between males and non-Iow-phase females
is not statistically significant either. But low phase females make more costly choices
than males (5% significance).
These results imply that hormones may matter in the selection of competitive
environments, but only if the strength of the competition or the probability of winning
is relatively unknown. If there is little information, then females in the low-hormone
phase make more costly decisions than males and non-low phase females. But there
are no significant differences in expected value losses between genders or between
different hormonal phases for females if good relative performance information is
available. 19
3.4.7.3 Absenteeism, Cancellations and Tardiness
This study was structured to have a large number of low-hormone phase females
to compare with the rest of the sample. Due to the noisiness of the menstrual cycle,
it is difficult to predict the low hormonal phase for females. Using the screening
survey, female subjects were scheduled for their sessions according to their predicted
cycle day. This was calculated using self reported data about the start of subjects'
previous menstrual periods. Whenever possible these data were combined with self
reported data concerning females' hormonal contraceptive regimens. Once the cycle
day could be predicted, then a set of possible session days were provided to potential
participants and they chose and confirmed these days with a research assistant. For
19These insignificant differences are not shown here.
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individuals to be scheduled, they had to confirm that they would attend a specific
session.
Absenteeism, cancellations and tardiness are frequent in experiments. In this
study, because of the screening survey and experiment exit surveys, something can
be learned about the individuals who do not show up for their scheduled session
or cancel at the last moment or are tardy. Ichino and Moretti (2009) found that
female worker absenteeism was highly correlated with the female menstrual cycle at a
regular job. Due to systematically greater incidences of absences and cancellations in
predicted low phase females in this experimental setting, I find results that support
their findings.
Table 26 shows that females are significantly less likely to show up as scheduled
when compared to males. The table shows the proportion of participants that
attended the experiment sessions as scheduled, meaning they were present and
punctual. 79% of the males showed up as scheduled. Based on predicted phases,
only 62% of low phase females low phase females attended as scheduled while non-low
phase females attended 72% of the time. These differences between attendance rates
of low phase and non-low phase females were significant (5% level). Furthermore,
non-low phase females were significantly (10% level) less likely to attend compared
to males. Thus, there is both a gender difference in attendance as well as a difference
in attendance related to the phase of the female menstrual cycle.20
20Attendance rates suggest that 62 low phase females should be identified in the experiment, but
due to error in predicting the female menstrual cycle only 45 session participants can be classified
in the low phase.
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These attendance results suggest there may be a systematic bias in the hormonal
phase of females who show up to experiment sessions. Additionally, if females who do
not show up to sessions in this study are the ones who have worse symptoms during
the low phase, or are more likely to behave differently, then a selection bias may add
a downward bias to the hormonal effects found in this study. Since this study was
partly focused on hormonal fluctuations, attempts were made to incentivize more
low phase females to attend once this bias was found to exist. Part way through
the study, due to low attendance from scheduled predicted low phase females, the
participation payment of $5 was raised to $10 for low phase females to induce greater
attendance of these females. 21 Even with this increase in participation payments for
low phase females, a significant and systematic difference exists between individuals
who attended sessions as scheduled and confirmed.
3.5 Discussion
In this study, I show that gender differences in compensation choices that have
been found in other studies are robust to a variety of protocol changes, including
different tasks, and variations in the degree of competitiveness of the available choices.
This consistency is further shown by the similar choices made by individuals who
participated in a second iteration of the experiment. I also find that females' choices
vary across the menstrual cycle: in a low-hormone phase, females are less likely to
enter tournaments than during a non-low phase. However, once relative performance
21These females were not informed as to the reason they were receiving a higher participation
payment.
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information is provided to subjects, all these differences for competitive environment
selections become smaller and statistically insignificant.
Previous studies have shown that the gender differences in compensation choices
persist even after controlling for confidence and have concluded that an underlying
gender difference in the taste for competition must drive the result. But if the choice
differences originate from a difference in preferences for competitive environments
then the selection differences should remain even after relative performance feedback is
provided. Another possible explanation would be a gender difference in risk aversion.
However, I control for risk aversion and beliefs about relative ability. With these
controls, a gender difference still remains in the uninformed treatment, but is removed
once subjects receive relative performance feedback. These results suggest that a lack
of knowledge about the distribution of the quality of potential competitors causes
males and females to make very different choices. Kagel and Roth (1995) define
ambiguity as "known to be missing information." Thus, an explanation that would
be consistent with these results is that males and females make compensation decisions
differently when the level of ambiguity is high; once ambiguity is removed they behave
similarilly.
I have also shown that hormonal fluctuations affect female entry into competitive
environments when there is no relative performance information. This result can be
particularly valuable for females to consider for important decisions such as choosing
graduate programs or career choices. Females can adapt behaviors or make choices
to mitigate or remove the effects of these hormonal fluctuations. Females are able
to control these fluctuations by changing their hormonal contraceptive regimen such
--_._---- _ .._.-
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that they would not experience a low-hormone phase. Females may also refrain
from making competitive environment choices during the low-hormone phase. Such
behaviors would only have value if there is poor information about the quality of
individuals that are part of the competitor pool.
Affirmative action policies are often used to encourage more females to partic-
ipate in competitive environments in the workplace and in educational institutions.
These policies typically involve increasing efforts to recruit females or changing the
acceptance or promotion process to favor females. The results from this study
suggest that providing better information to applicants and labor force participants
about their relative abilities may also reduce the gender differences. Many work and
educational environments where affirmative action policies are implemented involve a
great deal of ambiguity concerning relative abilities of individuals in the employee or
student pool. If feedback eliminates the gender differences in compensation choices
then it may be possible to change gender specific participation rates in competitive
environments without necessarily altering the structure of the recruitment, acceptance
or promotion process.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
This study has called into question whether a basic female distaste for
competition is driving selection differences. Instead, these results suggest that males
and females may process information differently, and make decisions differently,
when ambiguity exists. These selection differences in the absence of information
are heightened for females in the low-hormone phase of their cycle. Thus, gender
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differences for competition are not just dependent on the informational environment,
but also on the hormonal cycle of females.
Although this study has shed some light on the possible causes of gender
differences with respect to choices for competitive environments, there is still a
long way to go before these differences between males and females are thoroughly
understood. Relative performance information, or the lack there of, seems to playa
vital role in these selection differences. One cannot say that the choice differences
between females and males are caused by hormonal differences, but due to the
correlations of choices with low and high hormone phases, this study does suggest that
hormones may playa role in compensation choices for females. To accurately identify
whether hormones are a determining factor for these choice differences, further study
will require the measurement of hormone levels within subjects.
-----------_._---.
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TABLE 24. Ordered Probit: Hormone Effects for Relative Information (Treatment
5)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All All Females Only Risk
VARIABLES Pooled RE RE RE
Female -0.07 -0.13 0.10
(0.15) (0.20) (0.24)
() () 0
Low Phase 0.03 0.13 0.12 -0.12
(0.21) (0.25) (0.27) (0.29)
0 0 0 0
Confidence (T1) 0.23 0.32 0.21 0.54
(0.25) (0.31) (0.53) (0.36)
0 0 0 0
Improve (T2) 0.76 0.92 1.06 0.49
(0.20) (0.26) (0040) (0.33)
(***) (***) (***) 0
%-tile Rank (T1) 2.18 2.61 2.63 2.33
(0.25) (0.35) (0.55) (0.38)
(***) (***) (***) (***)
Risk Controls No No No Yes
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
observations 328 328 155 211
11 -307.8 -303.9 -143.3 -183.4
chi2 104.7 93.82 45.89 75.79
r2_p 0.145
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
TABLE 25. Expected Value Loss in Treatment 4
Mean Std. Error
Male
Non-Low
Low
4.91 0.72
Female
6.52 1.30
8.50 2.57
TABLE 26. Session Attendance After Confirmation
Gender
Proportion N
Male 0.79 217
Female 0.68 243
Total 0.73 460
Females by Predicted Phase
Proportion N
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Not Low
Low
Total
0.72 141
0.62 102
0.68 246
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CHAPTER IV
GENDER DIFFERENCES IN A MARKET WITH RELATIVE PERFORMANCE
FEEDBACK.
4.1 Introduction
Firms and academic institutions or grant giving agencies use tournament
contests to promote individuals or allocate funds to different applicants, employees,
and students. In many of these contests, individuals cannot view the quality of other
competitors. The decision to enter a certain type of tournament (or firm) is largely
based on subjective estimates of the probability of success. The only individuals who
have good information as to the distribution of the quality of tournament contestants
are the judges or evaluators that choose the winners of these contests.
In laboratory settings, where information regarding the quality of competitors
is not available to potential contest entrants, it has been found that females are less
likely to enter such tournament contests (Niederle & Vesterlund 2007). This gender
difference in the selection into tournament contests has been used to explain the low
number of females in top level management positions. A recent experiment has shown
that females and males select into tournament contests in a similar manner when they
are fully informed of their relative rank and the distribution of performance for all
potential competitors (Chapter III). This result suggests that males and females
may choose to compete in a similar fashion when participating in a labor market
where relative performance information is available. Professional athletes competing
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in individual sports are a great test case for the effects of this information since they
have access to information about the quality of their potential competitors. These
athletes structure their competition schedules with fairly accurate information about
the quality of competition they may face in a given contest. Based on this information,
athletes may choose to enter more difficult or easier tournament contests during the
competitive season. This type of scheduling and choice behavior is used to schedule
tennis tournament entrants by the International Tennis Federation (ITF).
The ITF is a governing body designed to create competition opportunities and
keep track of entry and results for tennis players who are trying to play for a living.
For females, ITF tournaments usually involve players who are ranked from about 100
to 1,250 (or unranked) in the world. These tournaments are used as a stepping stone
to qualify for the Women's Tennis Association (WTA) tournaments, which involve
players ranked in the top 100 in the world and pay substantially more. For males, the
ranking of individuals competing in ITF tournaments is much more diverse as players
tend to be ranked from 200 to 2000 in the world. Men use these ITF tournaments to
improve their world ranking and eventually qualify to compete in the more lucrative
tournaments organized by the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP).
These institutions are structured to allow individuals to enter and compete in
tournaments with as much knowledge as possible about potential competitors because
the institutions are designed to provide tournaments with good matches. At the ITF
level, individuals provide preference ordering of the tournaments they would like to
enter on a given week. These preference orderings are publicly available and, by
the time a deadline approaches, individuals are best served by choosing the ordering
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that maximizes the expected value of their efforts. At the ATP and WTA level, the
preference ordering is less of a factor as there are fewer tournaments that top level
individuals enter in any given week. Though there are fewer tournaments in any given
week, the prize money awarded at these tournaments is significantly higher, as are
the world ranking points.1
By examining professional tennis players, I assess whether males and females
choose to compete in a similar fashion in these competitive arenas. One would
expect that the females attempting to compete in a sport for a living would be more
competitive than those who do not. Given that the labor market for professional
tennis players provides plenty of relative performance data, a plausible hypothesis
would be that females and males choose to compete similarly in the sporting world
of professional tennis. These are the most competitive tennis players for each gender;
thus, one would expect similarities in how they choose to compete and how they
respond to performance feedback. By using lagged performance, one can observe if
females and males respond to performance feedback in a similar manner.
These tennis tournaments also provide a unique opportunity to examine
potential differences in relative performance feedback using real world data as opposed
to data gathered in an experimental setting. Response to performance feedback can
have mixed effects. Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez (2009) note that it is possible
that performance feedback can lower efforts in multiple period settings when agents
have heterogeneous abilities. In such settings, higher ability individuals exert less
lWorld ranking points are accumulated over a 12 month rolling calendar basis. The higher the
point total the better the rank of an individual.
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effort than without performance feedback and lower ability individuals may find
it optimal to choose to exert less effort knowing that they cannot perform better
than the high ability individuals (these choices may very well be optimal). In an
economic experiment concerning feedback and its effect on effort, it was found that
feedback does reduce effort for different forms of compensation such as piece rates and
tournaments (T. Eriksson, A. Poulsen & M.e. Villeval 2009). But in other settings
performance feedback has led to more efficient choices. This is evident in studies
exploring the effects of feedback for students. Azmat and Iriberri (2009) find that
grades improved for the entire distribution of students when they were given relative
performance feedback. Bandiera et al. (2008) find that feedback not only improved
test scores, but there were also no negative performance effects from feedback.
In Chapter III, I showed that relative performance feedback leads to more
efficient choices by both males and females. Previous work concluded that a preference
difference for competition led to gender differences in choices for competitive
environments (Niederle & Vesterlund 2007), but this result shows that this choice to
compete is not driven strictly by confidence nor preferences for or against competition.
Consequently relative performance feedback may be valuable in moving more high
ability females towards more competitive settings. But an important question
becomes: does the provision of relative performance feedback lead females towards
more competitive settings? Or do males and females respond differently to relative
performance feedback when choosing to enter tournaments that may affect their
livelihoods? To answer these questions, I examine how performance in previous
tournaments affects choices by females and males to enter competitive tournaments.
~ - --~ -------
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4.2 Background for Tennis Data
The major reason for using ITF tournaments is due to the structure the
organization uses in scheduling tournament attendance. Each week there are multiple
tennis tournaments that an athlete may attend. In 2008, there were over four-hundred
ITF tennis tournaments for females with total prize money of ten-million dollars as
well as over one-hundred other tournaments including Federation Cup tennis and
WTA tournaments. The prize money for ITF tournaments for women is capped at
one-hundred thousand dollars per tournament for females, and all WTA tournaments
have greater prize money amounts.
TABLE 27. WTA Points Table
Round W F SF QF R16 R32 R64 R128
Grand Slams 2000 1400 900 500 280 16 100 5
Premier 96S 1000 700 450 250 140 80 50 5
Premier 64S 1000 700 450 250 140 80 5
Premier 32S 470 320 200 120 60 1
Int. 32S 280 200 130 70 30 1
ITF 100K+H 150 110 80 40 20 1
ITF lOOK 140 100 70 36 18 1
ITF 75K+H 130 90 58 32 16 1
ITF 75K 110 78 50 30 14 1
ITF 50K+H 90 64 40 24 12 1
ITF 50K 70 50 32 18 10 1
ITF 25K 50 34 24 14 8 1
ITF 10K 12 8 6 4 1
Points allocated as you lose round.
2009 Prize Money example. Indian Wells.
Prize money
1
605K 295K 148K 75K 40K 21K 11.5K 7K
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Surprisingly, at the ITF level, males receive significantly less prize money than
females. In 2008 there were over five-hundred ITF tennis tournaments for males with
total prize money of six-million dollars as well as over one-hundred other tournaments
including Davis Cup tennis and ATP tournaments which pay significantly more than
the ITF tournaments. The prize money for ITF tournaments for men is capped at
fifteen-thousand dollars per tournament. Thus, the ITF runs lower level tournaments
for the males and the prize money differences between the types of tournaments
that these males could choose from range between ten-thousand to fifteen-thousand
dollars. Consequently there are slight institutional differences between males and
females which seem to lead to greater pecuniary outcomes for females competing at
lower levels. Examining the difFerence in world ranking points for females, in Table
27, compared to males, in Table 28, it becomes evident that the prize spread for
winning is greater for males in terms of world ranking points. Such differences in
point spreads between winning and losing may help explain Paserman's (2007) result
that women see a drop in performance in decisive sets when compared to men.
For each week that an athlete plans to compete, he or she must provide a
preference ranking for the tournaments he or she is interested in attending. For
example, if there are four tournaments in a given week and an individual is interested
in potentially attending one or two of them, then they must submit their preferences
between the two tournaments by ranking them. Three weeks prior to the start of
the tournament the preference ordering becomes closed. Individuals of the highest
world rank get their first preference so long as there is space in the tournament.
If there is no space in the preferred tournament then the individual gets into the
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TABLE 28. ATP Points Table
Round W F SF QF R16 R32 R64 R128
Grand Slams 2000 1250 720 360 180 90 45 10
Tour Finals (1.5K) +500 +400 +200
Tour Masters 1000 600 360 180 90 45 10(25) (10)
Tour 500 500 300 180 90 45 (20)
Tour 250 250 150 90 45 25 (10)
Challenger 125K+ H 125 75 45 25 10
Challenger 125K 110 65 40 20 9
Challenger lOOK 100 60 35 18 8
Challenger 75K 90 55 33 17 8
Challenger 50K 80 48 29 15 7
Challenger 35K+ H 80 48 29 15 6
Futures 15K+H 35 20 10 4 1
Futures 15K
I
27 15 8 3 1
Futures 10K 18 10 6 2 1
Points allocated as you lose round.
2009 Prize Money example. Indian Wells.
Prize money [@5K 295K 148K 75K 40K 21K 11.5K 7K
next preferred tournament conditional on there being space in that tournament.
Individuals' tournament preference orderings are based on a number of characteristics
relating mainly to prize money, world ranking points, and probability of winning
matches. An individual may choose not to compete in a tournament after already
entering. To do this, they must pay a nominal fine of about $150 dollars for rTF
tournaments and up to a few thousand for higher level tournaments. At higher level
tournaments, exemptions are made for minor injuries. Consequently, it is common to
see athletes claim injury as opposed to paying the fine. 2
2This would likely change if the size of the fine would decrease or the cost of a physician would
increase.
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In the data set being used for the female portion of this study, I examine
the choices made by about 3,500 females for about 600 tournaments during an
approximate 55 week period. For the males, I examine 3,500 males for about 1000
tournaments for about 45 weeks. The preference ordering is of interest, but very few
men choose to order beyond their second choice. In comparison, females seem to
choose a lot more second or third or fourth tournaments. These gender differences
are shown in Table 29.
TABLE 29. Tournament Preference Observations
Preference Females. Males
1 64,445 45,555
2 24,821 11,007
3 14,014 5,785
4 8,604 3,636
5 5,494 2,458
6 3,332 1,710
Total 120,713 70,151
Previous economic literature has used the outcomes from professional tennis
tournaments to examine the incentive effects of prizes in tournaments (T. Lallemand,
R. Plasman & F. Rycx 2008, Keith F. Gilsdorf & Vasant Sukhatme 2008a). As well,
professional tennis player data have been used to examine sequential elimination
tournament effects (K.F. Gilsdorf & V.A. Sukhatme 2008b). These other studies
examined the most elite tennis players possible. This study differs because 1 examine
a much broader group of tennis players and because 1 am able to link performance
data with competitive environment selection. This preference ordering of tournaments
is not entirely possible at the higher level tournaments because there are far fewer
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tournaments occurring at the same time. Thus, at times individuals will have a top
priority to enter a large tournament such as the Australian Open, a time when there
are almost no other possible choices.
Despite these issues, these data provide a unique opportunity to observe
both men and women entering competitive environments in a career-type setting.
Though these competitors may not represent the average business professional, the
opportunity to study such an environment may lead to greater insights into how
individuals may make choices in more common environments.
4.3 Tournament Selection
One interesting part part of the tennis labor market is that all competitors
receive a noisy signal of the quality of potential opponents in the form of a world
ranking. The quality of a tennis player, Q(Xi), is a function of a number of inputs
(Xi), such as individual talent, coach quality, hours practiced, allocation of hours
towards specific skills, mental toughness, emotional control... specific to individual
i. The signal used by most to determine quality is a sum of an individual's world
ranking points (R), but this signal includes an exogenous error component as shown
below:
Suppose that two individuals, i and j, decide to compete to see who is the better
tennis player. The probability that i beats j is then as follows:
--- ---_._---
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Prob(Q(xi) > Q(Xj)) = Prob(Ri - R j > Ej - Ei)
= Prob(Ei - Ej > Rj - R;)
It is because of this noisy signal of quality that individuals, i and j, find it necessary
even to play the game. If quality was visible and measured without error, or
without luck, then competition between these individuals would be unnecessary. This
uncertainty is why sports have audiences and teams and athletes have supporters.
Even when there is a winner or a loser, one cannot distinguish whether the victory
came from the difference in quality between opponents or from an exogenous error
component often described as luck. A major difference between sports and other
labor markets is that there is usually a clearer signal of quality in sports markets
due to numerous different forms of relative ranking methodologies. Such rankings
are non-existent in the majority of other labor markets. It is likely that the cost of
creating a measure to find the best copy writer in the world does not outweigh the
benefit, though it very much matters when it comes to hitting a yellow fuzzy ball.
Consider an individual who is examining a set of N possible tournament contests
to enter. Each tournament n, is such that n E {I, 2, 3... , N}. In tennis the
individual receives a signal regarding the quality of potential opponents by examining
the preferences and rankings of all individuals that are considering entering the
tournament. The individual may use a moment (e.g. mean) of the distribution
of world rank points for competitors entering the tournament. This moment allows
each competitor to gauge the probability of winning a match against the average
tournament entrant. Let Rn represent the mean ranking points of potential opponents
entering tournament n, such that Rn = Qn + En. Assuming independence between
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rounds, this implies that the probabilities of winning rounds in a sequential match
play tournament are as follows:
Probability of winning first round
- 2Probability of winning second round Prob(ci - En > Rn - R i )
Probability of winning k round
These probabilities allow an individual to calculate the expected value of entering each
of the available tournaments. For simplicity, I am ignoring the non-random scheduling
of opponents for each round and I am ignoring other compensating differentials that
may lead an individual to choose a tournament that does not maximize expected
value from cash prizes and ranking points. In the empirical model, such potentially
confounding factors will be included. I take as given, the effects upon optimal effort
from prize differences, since this subject has been previously explored using tennis
data (Gilsdorf & Sukhatme 2008a). I assume that all individuals choose optimal
effort levels and consider the prize spread between winning and losing in choosing
those effort levels. This prize spread and prize level is partly a reflection of the
total tournament prize money; thus, the prize money will be used as a proxy for the
monetary benefit from competition.
Using these win probabilities for each round and prize money and world rank
point values for winning each round an individual can compare the expected values
from competing in each of the different tournaments. Individuals should then rank
order tournaments according to these subjectively calculated expected values.3 It
3For simplicity I am ignoring the strategic implications of the publishing of the preference ordering
for tournaments by individuals. At the time of the deadline, I assume that all individuals choose
- -------------
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is this type of selection that will be considered in this study. The following section
provides a brief analysis of the data collected for both men and women tennis players.
4.4 Tournaments and Performance
Data collection for tournament preference orderings for professional female
tennis players began in March 2009. Females rank order up to six tournaments
each week that they consider entering. There are many players who only enter one
tournament, but these individuals are less likely to be travelling professionals; thus,
a large portion of the sample consists of a single preference of 1. Altogether, there
are 120,713 observations of tournament preferences by females. The tabulations for
all the preference ordering data are provided in Table 29.
TABLE 30. Summary statistics for women.
Variable
WeekOfTourney
Ranking
Age
Tourn. Total Games Won
Tourn. Total Games Lost
Prize Money
TourneyRank Avg.
Priority
HomeField
Tourn. Match Wins
LagTourn. Total Games Won
Mean
32.58
827.34
22.32
25.78
14.48
260116.81
323.31
1.97
0.06
0.99
3.72
Std. Dev.
16.84
408.68
3.47
16.32
10.85
1777635.23
101.13
1.34
0.24
1.29
10.98
N
21790
123244
115157
18989
18989
117458
97048
120713
128203
18989
128203
to reveal themselves such that they maximize expected value. The assumption is that anyone
individual will not change the average rank of tournament competitors.
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To go along with this tournament entry data, I have also collected performance
data for all individuals who entered any professional tournaments during the same
period. The summary statistics for the performance of females and tournament
preferences are shown in Table 30. The average total purse per preference observation
is $260,000. The average world ranking of competitors is 827. The average rank per
tournament is 323.
For this study, data collection for tournament preference ordering for profes-
sional male tennis players began in July 2009. Though males also rank order up
to six tournaments each week, there are many individuals who choose to provide
a preference for only one tournament. However, about 38% of top priority choices
for females also include an alternative. For males this percentage is much lower,
at 24%. This difference suggests that males must see less need to provide possible
secondary choices to compete. Altogether during this time there are approximately
70,000 observations of tournament preference choices by males.
TABLE 31. Summary statistics for men.
Variable
WeekOrrourney
Ranking
Age
Tourn. Total Games Won
Tourn. Total Games Lost
Prize Money
Avg. Rank Tourney
Priority
HomeField
Tourn. Match Wins
LagTourn. Total Games Won
Mean
35.68
586.27
23.89
26.45
16.31
402671.48
836.98
1.74
0.78
1.01
5.26
Std. Dev.
17.4
556.9
4.13
16.93
11.88
2493353.52
337.41
1.26
0.41
1.31
13.28
N
27890
21003
27639
18860
18860
84314
80352
70151
88331
18860
88638
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The summary statistics for the performance of males and tournament prefer-
ences are shown in Table 31. The average total purse per preference observation is
$403,000. The average world ranking of competitors is 586. The average rank per
tournament is 836. As Figure 12 shows, the prize money tournaments for males and
females are scheduled at similar times. Males do seem to have a larger number of
tournaments between $100,000 to $4.5 million when compared to females, but on the
lower spectrum females have more tournaments between $15000 to $100,000.
For the lower prize money tournaments, the data had to be collected manually.
This implies that the lower ranked individuals do not have their priority choice
observed for the entire sample. The female sample consists of more weeks than
the male sample. This difference in the samples is best shown by the ranking of
individuals entering tournaments as individuals with a ranking greater than 500 had
to be recorded manually. This gender specific sample difference is best observed in
Figure 13.
The number of matches that a competitor wins at a tournament is a measure of
success. I condense the data to tournament-specific values as opposed to examining
results round by round as this allows for a clearer comparison of tournament specific
factors that may determine success. In Table 32, I provide the log-linear regression
estimates using both the random and fixed effects for individuals to observe which
factors are positively related to success. The dependent variable to measure success is
the log of match wins. I find that estimates of the systematic effects of some factors,
such as hospitality (a categorical variable determining whether expenses were covered
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by the tournament), individual ranking, and previous performance from prior weeks
are very sensitive to the assumed error structure.
For females, home field advantage has a a large and significant impact on
individuals being able to win. Homefield is a categorical variable indicating whether
the tournament is hosted in an individual's home country. Top priority indicates
that a tournament was an individual's top choice and surprisingly it has a negative
effect on performance, which may indicate that females prefer to enter more difficult
tournaments. Not surprisingly, the average rank of players entered in a tournament
is positively correlated with success as the higher the rank of potential competitors,
the lower the quality of the potential competitors, the more likely an individual can
be successful.
The potential factors affecting male success in tournaments are shown in
Table 32. The estimated effect of previous performance is very sensitive to error
assumptions. As with females, the average rank of potential competitors is positively
correlated with performance. Unlike females, males' top choices for tournaments are
positively correlated with tournament success. This result suggests that males may be
better at choosing which tournaments to enter though one should note that females
typically have a larger choice set to choose from.
These performance regressions suggest that some factors such as the rank
of potential competitors and competing in one's home country may help both a
female and male competitor to be successful. Thus, these factors should also entice
individuals to enter such tournaments. On the otherhand, males and females see
performance differences when they enter in tournaments that were their top choice,
-- -_ .. -------------
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TABLE 32. Log of Match Wins in Tourney
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Female RE Female FE Male RE Male FE
Log_PrizeMoney -0.110 -0.130 -0.128 0.168
(0.041) (0.041) (0.185) (0.224)
*** ***
hospitality -0.016 -0.508 -0.022 0.190
(0.159) (0.170) (0.153) (0.175)
***
HomeField 0.231 0.350 -0.002 -0.005
(0.094) (0.109) (0.073) (0.101)
** ***
Log_TourneyRankAvg 2.898 3.525 2.668 3.781
(0.191) (0.203) (0.236) (0.277)
*** *** *** ***
Log_ranking -1.491 0.539 -2.391 1.911
(0.066) (0.161) (0.077) (0.267)
*** *** *** ***
Log_Age -0.668 16.297 0.284 93.357
(0.263) (16.837) (0.258) (29.561)
** ***
TopPriority -0.444 -0.538 0.241 0.254
(0.099) (0.114) (0.118) (0.134)
*** *** ** *
Log_WeekLagTournMatchWins_1 0.040 -0.005 0.092 -0.054
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
*** *** ***
Log_WeekLagTournMatchWins_2 0.017 -0.013 0.025 -0.075
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
** ***
Week y y y y
Surface controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 9,119 9,119 9,821 9,821
Number of id_p 704 704 1,944 1,944
r2_0 0.0775 0.00339 0.145 0.0138
r2_w 0.0626 0.0957 0.00125 0.0503
r2_b 0.159 0.00175 0.389 0.0431
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
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suggesting that males and females choose to enter tournaments differently. To explore
this issue, in the next session, I provide hazard function coefficient estimates for both
males and females to see if and how they may be choosing to enter into tournaments
differently.
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FIGURE 12. Tournaments and Prize Money
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FIGURE 13. Rankings and Top Priority
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4.5 Gender Differences for Tournament Entry
To examine if females and males choose to enter tournaments differently I
estimate a hazard model where failure is dictated by tournament entry into any
tournament. A hazard model should be appropriate for this type of comparison as I
am interested in comparing how men and women choose to compete. Thus a hazard
model with failure being associated with tournament entry provides an estimation
of which factors increase or decrease the chance of a failure occurring, which is an
occurrence of competition. An examination of these estimates should allow me to
observe whether females and males choose to compete differently.
I estimate the model separately for males and females. I find that males and
females seem to use very different criteria to enter. The results of the estimation for
females are shown in Table 33. Females are more likely to enter into a tournament if
it is in their home country (HomeField) and if they have a lower ranking. The prize
money effects are for entry are negligible or are not apparent for tournaments.
The two measures of WeekLagTournMatch Wins_l and WeekLagTournMatch-
Wins_2 measure how well individuals performed in a tournament in the previous
week (1) or two (2). Most importantly, being more successful in the previous two
tournaments leads to a lower chance of tournament entry. So positive performance
feedback from a competition leads to less subsequent competition by females.
The male hazard model coefficients are shown in Table 34. Three major differ-
ences become evident when comparing males' and females' entries into tournaments
in this setting:
TABLE 33. Female Tourney Entry
(1) (2)
VARIABLES _t _t
PrizeMoney 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
hospitality -0.094 -0.094
(0.044) (0.046)
** **
HomeField 0.204 0.204
(0.029) (0.029)
*** ***
TourneyRankAvg -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
ranking -0.004 -0.004
(0.000) (0.000)
*** ***
Age -0.009 -0.009
(0.003) (0.003)
*** ***
WeekLagTournMatchWins_1 -0.032 -0.032
(0.008) (0.009)
*** ***
WeekLagTournMatchWins_2 -0.021 -0.021
(0.008) (0.008)
** **
Surface controls Y Y
Observations 11,286 11,286
risk 33659 33659
N_fail 8700 8700
N_sub 710 710
chi2 3640 2082
N_clust 710
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
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1. Males are more likely to enter a tournament when housing is covered by
tournament organizers shown by the hospitality variable. Females do not
respond to such incentives.
2. Men respond to how competitive the field is at the tournament. A higher
average ranking of tournament entrants (TourneyRankA vg) makes for easier
competition and also makes it more likely that males will enter the tournament.
This average ranking has no effect on female tournament entry though it does
positively affect performance for females.
3. Most interestingly, the effect of relative performance feedback is completely
different for males than for females. If males do well in a tournament in the
previous week then they are more likely to enter into a tournament. On the
other hand females are less likely to enter a tournament if they perform well in
tournaments that occur two weeks prior to the tournament they are entering.
TABLE 34. Male Tourney Entry
(1) (2)
VARIABLES _t _t
PrizeMoneyNoCap 0.051 0.051
(0.004) (0.005)
*** ***
hospitality 0.436 0.436
(0.044) (0.054)
*** ***
HomeField 0.214 0.214
(0.022) (0.029)
*** ***
TourneyRankAvg 0.003 0.003
(0.000) (0.000)
*** ***
ranking
-0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
*** ***
Age
-0.037 -0.037
(0.003) (0.004)
*** ***
WeekLagTournMatchWins_1 0.113 0.113
(0.010) (0.014)
*** ***
WeekLagTournMatchWins_2 0.015 0.015
(0.011) (0.015)
Surface controls Y Y
Observations 9,463 9,463
risk 64599 64599
N_fail 8535 8535
N_sub 1935 1935
chi2 3192 2130
N_clust 1935
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<O.01, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l
124
125
4.6 Concluding Remarks
I find that males and females behave differently when it comes to selecting
into competitive environments even in a market with good relative performance
information. Previous findings (Chapter III) would suggest that relative performance
feedback may be enough to make males and females enter into competitive situations
in a similar fashion. In examining tournament entry by professional tennis players I
have found that good relative performance feedback may not be enough.
Females are less likely to remain competitive after being successful in recent
competitions, while males get more competitive with success in recent competitive
tournaments. Males seem to base part of the decision about whether to compete on
the strength of whom they are competing against. In contrast, females do not make
decisions on whether to compete based on how difficult the competition may be.
lt seems that feedback for competition may not necessarily be a good thing
to entice females to compete. Even in a high end of the distribution feedback has
different effects for females and males. lt may be the case that females and males
should have to pay for feedback. lt would seem that males would be willing to pay
for such information while females would not. It may be the case that females do not
necessarily have distaste for competition, but do have a distaste for publicly being
shown to be better than one another.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The preceding chapters have shown that information effects matter a great
deal for individual decision making about competition. Biology also plays a role
and biological functions such as hormonal fluctuations may lead to large changes in
the gender difference for for competition. Though in a laboratory setting it seemed
that good information could remove the effects of biological differences for entry into
competitive tournaments, it seems that this is not entirely the case. Even in markets
with limited ambiguity, consisting of very competitive individuals, gender differences
for entry into competitive situations still remain. Furthermore the response to positive
and negative performance feedback leads to very different behaviors between the
genders.
Though a lack of ambiguity can change some behaviors of agents at the margin,
it seems that good information alone is not enough to change gender differences
for competition. It may be that these differences are socially optimal as in repeated
similar situations, under similar contexts, men and women compete differently. Using
the measure of ambiguity aversion, as discussed in Chapter II, one can test as to the
role that ambiguity plays in individual decisions to compete. Such investigations
will provide greater insight into the mechanisms driving gender differences in labor
markets. This could lead to different policies in labor markets as firms may be better
served by providing more information about the quality of applicants applying for
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positions. Such policies may remove ambiguity concerning the competitive applicant
pool, which may lead more high ability women to compete for such positions. The goal
is to find the mechanisms leading to higher ability individuals entering competitive
situations. Given the gender differences explored here, it seems that we have moved
closer to understanding the gender differences for competition.
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